The law of one price in data envelopment analysis: Restricting weight flexibility across firms

The Law of One Price (LoOP) states that all firms face the same prices for their inputs and outputs under market equilibrium. Taken here as a normative condition for ‘efficiency prices’, this law has powerful implications for productive efficiency analysis, which have remained unexploited thus far. This paper shows how LoOP-based weight restrictions can be incorporated in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Utilizing the relation between industry-level and firm-level cost efficiency measures, we propose to apply a set of input prices that is common for all firms and that maximizes the cost efficiency of the industry. Our framework allows for firm-specific output weights and for variable returns-to-scale, and preserves the linear programming structure of the standard DEA. We apply the proposed methodology to the evaluation of the research efficiency of economics departments of Dutch Universities. This application shows that the methodology is computationally tractable for practical efficiency analysis, and that it helps in deepening the DEA analysis.     

Revenue management for a supply chain with two streams of customers

In this paper, we consider revenue management for a service supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier has a limited capacity of a perishable product and both the supplier and the retailer face customers. Each customer may choose to buy a product from either the supplier or the retailer by considering prices and the cost associated with switching. For the centralized model, the supplier determines the selling prices for both herself and the retailer, and the retailer simply collects a commission fee for each product sold. We derive monotone properties for the revenue functions and pricing strategies. Further, we show that the commission fee increases the retailer’s price while decreasing the supplier’s and leads to efficiency loss of the chain. For the decentralized decision-making model, the supplier and the retailer compete in price over time. Two models are considered. In the first, the retailer buys products from the supplier before the selling season and in the second the retailer shares products with the supplier in retailing. For both models, we discuss the existence of the equilibrium and characterize the optimal decisions. Numerical results are presented to illustrate properties of the models and to compare the supply chain performance between the centralized and the decentralized models.     

Product line selection and pricing under a share-of-surplus choice model

Product line selection and pricing decisions are critical to the profitability of many firms, particularly in today’s competitive business environment in which providers of goods and services are offering a broad array of products to satisfy customer needs.We address the problem of selecting a set of products to offer and their prices when customers select among the offered products according to a share-of-surplus choice model. A customer’s surplus is defined as the difference between his utility (willingness to pay) and the price of the product. Under the share-of-surplus model, the fraction of a customer segment that selects a product is defined as the ratio of the segment’s surplus from this particular product to the segment’s total surplus across all offered products with positive surplus for that segment.We develop a heuristic procedure for this non-concave, mixed-integer optimization problem. The procedure utilizes simulated annealing to handle the binary product selection variables, and a steepest-ascent-style procedure that relies on certain structural properties of the objective function to handle the non-concave, continuous portion of the problem involving the prices. We also develop a variant of our procedure to handle uncertainty in customer utilities. In computational studies, our basic procedures perform extremely well, producing solutions whose objective values are within about 5% of those obtained via enumerative methods. Our procedure to handle uncertain utilities also performs well, producing solutions with expected profit values that are roughly 10% higher than the corresponding expected profits from solutions obtained under the assumption of deterministic utilities.     

Quality investment and inspection policy in a supplier–manufacturer supply chain

This paper examines a serial supply chain that consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, each having imperfect production and inspection processes. Both the supplier and the manufacturer invest in quality improvement actions in their production processes to reduce defective items being produced. In addition to quality investment, the supplier engages in outbound inspection before sending the components to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer engages in inbound inspection, when receiving the components from the supplier, and outbound inspection, before sending final products to customers. We investigate the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s quality investment and inspection strategies in four noncooperative games with different degrees of information revealed. We study the effects of inspection-related information on both parties’ equilibrium strategies and profits, and further assess, at equilibrium, the rationality of the penalty on defective components.     

Shadow prices in nonconvex mathematical programming

In this paper a definition is proposed for the concept of shadow prices in nonconvex programming. For a nonlinear program with equality and inequality constraints, existence of these prices and bounds for their possible values are obtained under the Mangasarian—Fromowitz regularity condition. Their exact values and some continuity properties are obtained under the more restrictive linear independence regularity condition. A definition of equilibrium prices is also proposed. Under convexity assumptions, all definitions and results coincide with those already known on this subject in convex programming.This research was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada under Grant A-9273.     

Fan’s inequality in geodesic spaces

Fan’s minimax inequality is extended to the context of metric spaces with global nonpositive curvature. As a consequence, a much more general result on the existence of a Nash equilibrium is obtained.     

An extension of the Wang transform derived from Bühlmann’s economic premium principle for insurance risk

It is well known that the Wang transform [Wang, S.S., 2002. A universal framework for pricing financial and insurance risks. Astin Bull. 32, 213–234] for the pricing of financial and insurance risks is derived from Bühlmann’s economic premium principle [Bühlmann, H., 1980. An economic premium principle. Astin Bull. 11, 52–60]. The transform is extended to the multivariate setting by [Kijima M., 2006. A multivariate extension of equilibrium pricing transforms: The multivariate Esscher and Wang transforms for pricing financial and insurance risks, Astin Bull. 36, 269–283]. This paper further extends the results to derive a class of probability transforms that are consistent with Bühlmann’s pricing formula. The class of transforms is extended to the multivariate setting by using a Gaussian copula, while the multiperiod extension is also possible within the equilibrium pricing framework.     

Static super-replicating strategies for a class of exotic options

In this paper, we investigate static super-replicating strategies for European-type call options written on a weighted sum of asset prices. This class of exotic options includes Asian options and basket options among others. We assume that there exists a market where the plain vanilla options on the different assets are traded and hence their prices can be observed in the market. Both the infinite market case (where prices of the plain vanilla options are available for all strikes) and the finite market case (where only a finite number of plain vanilla option prices are observed) are considered. We prove that the finite market case converges to the infinite market case when the number of observed plain vanilla option prices tends to infinity.We show how to construct a portfolio consisting of the plain vanilla options on the different assets, whose pay-off super-replicates the pay-off of the exotic option. As a consequence, the price of the super-replicating portfolio is an upper bound for the price of the exotic option. The super-hedging strategy is model-free in the sense that it is expressed in terms of the observed option prices on the individual assets, which can be e.g. dividend paying stocks with no explicit dividend process known. This paper is a generalization of the work of Simon et al. [Simon, S., Goovaerts, M., Dhaene, J., 2000. An easy computable upper bound for the price of an arithmetic Asian option. Insurance Math. Econom. 26 (2–3), 175–184] who considered this problem for Asian options in the infinite market case. Laurence and Wang [Laurence, P., Wang, T.H., 2004. What’s a basket worth? Risk Mag. 17, 73–77] and Hobson et al. [Hobson, D., Laurence, P., Wang, T.H., 2005. Static-arbitrage upper bounds for the prices of basket options. Quant. Fin. 5 (4), 329–342] considered this problem for basket options, in the infinite as well as in the finite market case.As opposed to Hobson et al. [Hobson, D., Laurence, P., Wang, T.H., 2005. Static-arbitrage upper bounds for the prices of basket options. Quant. Fin. 5 (4), 329–342] who use Lagrange optimization techniques, the proofs in this paper are based on the theory of integral stochastic orders and on the theory of comonotonic risks.     

An Ekeland’s variational principle for set-valued mappings with applications

In this paper, we obtain a general Ekeland’s variational principle for set-valued mappings in complete metric space, which is different from those in [G.Y. Chen, X.X. Huang, Ekeland’s ε-variational principle for set-valued mapping, Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 48 (1998) 181–186; G.Y. Chen, X.X. Huang, S.H. Hou, General Ekeland’s Variational Principle for Set-Valued Mappings, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 106 (2000) 151–164; S.J. Li, W.Y. Zhang, On Ekeland’s variational Principle for set-valued mappings, Acta Mathematicae Application Sinica, English Series 23 (2007) 141–148]. By the result, we prove some existence results for a general vector equilibrium problem under nonconvex and compact or noncompact assumptions of its domain, respectively. Moreover, we give some equivalent results to the variational principle.     

Dynamics of a three-species food chain model with adaptive traits

A three-species food chain model is proposed with dynamically variable adaptive traits in the intermediate consumer. We prove that its solutions are non-negative and bounded, and we analyze the existence and stability of its equilibria. By applying Li and Muldowney’s [Li MY, Muldowney J. On Bendixson’s criterion. J Differ Equ 1993;106:27–39] high-dimensional Bendixson criterion, we show that the positive equilibrium is globally stable under specific conditions. We support our analytical findings with numerical simulations.     

Strategic commitment to price to stimulate downstream innovation in a supply chain

It is generally in a firm’s interest for its supply chain partners to invest in innovations. To the extent that these innovations either reduce the partners’ variable costs or stimulate demand for the end product, they will tend to lead to higher levels of output for all of the firms in the chain. However, in response to the innovations of its partners, a firm may have an incentive to opportunistically increase its own prices. The possibility of such opportunistic behavior creates a hold-up problem that leads supply chain partners to underinvest in innovation. Clearly, this hold-up problem could be eliminated by a pre-commitment to price. However, by making an advance commitment to price, a firm sacrifices an important means of responding to demand uncertainty. In this paper we examine the trade-off that is faced when a firm’s channel partner has opportunities to invest in either cost reduction or quality improvement, i.e. demand enhancement. Should it commit to a price in order to encourage innovation, or should it remain flexible in order to respond to demand uncertainty. We discuss several simple wholesale pricing mechanisms with respect to this trade-off.     

Approximate basket options valuation for a jump-diffusion model

In this paper we discuss the approximate basket options valuation for a jump-diffusion model. The underlying asset prices follow some correlated diffusion processes with idiosyncratic and systematic jumps. We suggest a new approximate pricing formula which is the weighted sum of Roger and Shi’s lower bound and the conditional second moment adjustments. We show that the approximate value is always within the lower and upper bounds of the option and is very sharp in our numerical tests.     

Continuous-time portfolio selection with liability: Mean–variance model and stochastic LQ approach

In this paper we formulate a continuous-time mean–variance portfolio selection model with multiple risky assets and one liability in an incomplete market. The risky assets’ prices are governed by geometric Brownian motions while the liability evolves according to a Brownian motion with drift. The correlations between the risky assets and the liability are considered. The objective is to maximize the expected terminal wealth while minimizing the variance of the terminal wealth. We derive explicitly the optimal dynamic strategy and the mean–variance efficient frontier in closed forms by using the general stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) control technique. Several special cases are discussed and a numerical example is also given.     

Imposing boundary conditions in Sinc method using highest derivative approximation

Sinc approximate methods are often used to solve complex boundary value problems such as problems on unbounded domains or problems with endpoint singularities. A recent implementation of the Sinc method [Li, C. and Wu, X., Numerical solution of differential equations using Sinc method based on the interpolation of the highest derivatives, Applied Mathematical Modeling 31 (1) 2007 1–9] in which Sinc basis functions are used to approximate the highest derivative in the governing equation of the boundary value problem is evaluated for structural mechanics applications in which interlaminar stresses are desired. We suggest an alternative approach for specifying the boundary conditions, and we compare the numerical results for analysis of a laminated composite Timoshenko beam, implementing both Li and Wu’s approach and our alternative approach for applying the boundary conditions. For the Timoshenko beam problem, we obtain accurate results using both approaches, including transverse shear stress by integration of the 3D equilibrium equations of elasticity. The beam results indicate our approach is less dependent on the selection of the Sinc mesh size than Li and Wu’s SIHD. We also apply SIHD to analyze a classical laminated composite plate. For the plate example, we experience difficulty in obtaining a complete system of equations using Li and Wu’s approach. For our approach, we suggest that additional necessary information may be obtained by applying the derivatives of the boundary conditions on each edge. Using this technique, we obtain accurate results for deflection and stresses, including interlaminar stresses by integration of the 3D equilibrium equations of elasticity. Our results for both the beam and the plate problems indicate that this approach is easily implemented, has a high level of accuracy, and good convergence properties.     

Distributed Price Adjustment Based on Convex Analysis

In this paper, we suggest a distributed process of price adjustment toward a partial market equilibrium. As the main contribution, our algorithm of price adjustment is computationally efficient and decentralized. Its convergence properties are crucially based on convex analysis. The proposed price adjustment corresponds to a subgradient scheme for minimizing a special nonsmooth convex function. This function is the total excessive revenue of the market’s participants and its minimizers are equilibrium prices. As the main result, the algorithm of price adjustment is shown to converge to equilibrium prices. Additionally, the market clears on average during the price adjustment process, i.e., by historical averages of supply and demand. Moreover, a global rate of convergence is obtained. We endow our algorithm with decentralized prices by introducing the trade design with price initiative of producers. The latter suggests that producers settle and update their individual prices, and consumers buy at the lowest purchase price.     

Equilibrium in an ambiguity-averse mean–variance investors market

In a financial market composed of n risky assets and a riskless asset, where short sales are allowed and mean–variance investors can be ambiguity averse, i.e., diffident about mean return estimates where confidence is represented using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets, we derive a closed form portfolio rule based on a worst case max–min criterion. Then, in a market where all investors are ambiguity-averse mean–variance investors with access to given mean return and variance–covariance estimates, we investigate conditions regarding the existence of an equilibrium price system and give an explicit formula for the equilibrium prices. In addition to the usual equilibrium properties that continue to hold in our case, we show that the diffidence of investors in a homogeneously diffident (with bounded diffidence) mean–variance investors’ market has a deflationary effect on equilibrium prices with respect to a pure mean–variance investors’ market in equilibrium. Deflationary pressure on prices may also occur if one of the investors (in an ambiguity-neutral market) with no initial short position decides to adopt an ambiguity-averse attitude. We also establish a CAPM-like property that reduces to the classical CAPM in case all investors are ambiguity-neutral.     

Sequential Discrete p-Facility Models for Competitive Location Planning

Two new models for duopolistic competitive discrete location planning with sequential acting and variable delivered prices are introduced. If locations and prices are assumed to be set once and for all by the players, the resulting bilevel program is nonlinear. Under the assumption that further price adjustments are possible, i.e., that a Nash equilibrium in prices is reached, the model can be simplified to a linear discrete bilevel formulation. It is shown that in either situation players should not share any locations or markets if they strive for profit-maximization.For the situation with price adjustments, a heuristic solution procedure is suggested. In addition, the bilevel models are shown to serve as a basis from which different well-known location models – as, for example, the p-median problem, the preemptive location problem and the maximum covering problem – can be derived as special cases.     

Structured products equilibria in conic two price markets

A novel equilibrium theory is developed for two price markets permitting investors to trade personally designed structured products. Classical market clearing is enhanced for structured products where the market allows these products to be freely bought at ask prices or sold for bid prices. Competitive pressures lead the market to lower the ask prices and raise the bid prices with the market offering individual investors the widest possible set of acceptable risks provided the aggregate counter cash flow held by the market is consistent with a more conservative prespecified set of acceptable risks. We learn that in equilibrium heterogeneous investors inherit a common hedging objective of maximizing the bid prices of the final structured product sold to market or equivalently minimizing the ask price of what is bought.     

Credibility of Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-State Differential Games

We characterize in this paper the credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies for the class of linear-state differential games. We derive a general condition for credibility and illustrate its use on two differential games taken from the literature of environmental economics and knowledge accumulation. We show that the proposed linear incentive strategies are not always credible. Further, we provide alternative nonlinear credible strategies which suggest that we should not stick only to linear incentive strategies, even in a simple class of differential games such as the linear-state one.This research was completed when the first author was visiting professor at GERAD, HEC, Montréal. The first author’s research was partially supported by MCYT under project BEC2002-02361 and by JCYL under project VA051/03, confinanced by FEDER funds. The second author’s research was supported by NSERC, Canada.     

Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms

We compare two alternative mechanisms for capping prices in two-settlement electricity markets. With sufficient lead time, forward market prices are implicitly capped by competitive pressure of potential entry that will occur when forward prices rise above some backstop price. Another more direct approach is to cap spot prices through a regulatory intervention. In this paper we explore the implications of these two alternative mechanisms in a two-settlement Cournot equilibrium framework. We formulate the market equilibrium as a stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) capturing congestion effects, probabilistic contingencies and horizontal market power. As an illustrative test case, we use the 53-bus Belgian electricity network with representative generator costs but hypothetical demand and ownership structure. Compared to a price-uncapped two-settlement system, a forward cap increases firms’ incentives for forward contracting, whereas a spot cap reduces such incentives. Moreover, in both cases, more forward contracts are committed as the generation resource ownership structure becomes more diversified.