On modal logics arising from scattered locally compact Hausdorff spaces

For a topological space X, let $\mathsf{L}(X)$ be the modal logic of X where □ is interpreted as interior (and hence ◇ as closure) in X. It was shown in [3] that the modal logics S4, S4.1, S4.2, S4.1.2, S4.Grz, ${\mathsf{S4}.\mathsf{Grz}}_n$ ($n\ge 1$), and their intersections arise as $\mathsf{L}(X)$ for some Stone space X. We give an example of a scattered Stone space whose logic is not such an intersection. This gives an affirmative answer to [3, Question 6.2]. On the other hand, we show that a scattered Stone space that is in addition hereditarily paracompact does not give rise to a new logic; namely we show that the logic of such a space is either S4.Grz or ${\mathsf{S4}.\mathsf{Grz}}_n$ for some $n\ge 1$. In fact, we prove this result for any scattered locally compact open hereditarily collectionwise normal and open hereditarily strongly zero-dimensional space.     

Provability logic and the completeness principle

The logic $\mathsf{iGLC}$ is the intuitionistic version of Löb's Logic plus the completeness principle $A\to \square A$. In this paper, we prove an arithmetical completeness theorems for $\mathsf{iGLC}$ for theories equipped with two provability predicates □ and △ that prove the schemes $A\to △A$ and $\square △S\to \square S$ for $S\in {\mathrm{\Sigma }}_1$. We provide two salient instances of the theorem. In the first, □ is fast provability and △ is ordinary provability and, in the second, □ is ordinary provability and △ is slow provability.Using the second instance, we reprove a theorem previously obtained by Mohammad Ardeshir and Mojtaba Mojtahedi [1] determining the ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_1$-provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic.     

On arithmetical completeness of the logic of proofs

In this paper, we establish a stronger version of Artemov's arithmetical completeness theorem of the Logic of Proofs ${\mathsf{LP}}_0$. Moreover, we prove a version of the uniform arithmetical completeness theorem of ${\mathsf{LP}}_0$.     

Labeled sequent calculus for justification logics

Justification logics are modal-like logics that provide a framework for reasoning about justifications. This paper introduces labeled sequent calculi for justification logics, as well as for combined modal-justification logics. Using a method due to Sara Negri, we internalize the Kripke-style semantics of justification and modal-justification logics, known as Fitting models, within the syntax of the sequent calculus to produce labeled sequent calculi. We show that all rules of these systems are invertible and the structural rules (weakening and contraction) and the cut rule are admissible. Soundness and completeness are established as well. The analyticity for some of our labeled sequent calculi are shown by proving that they enjoy the subformula, sublabel and subterm properties. We also present an analytic labeled sequent calculus for $\mathsf{S4LPN}$ based on Artemov–Fitting models.     

Equivalence of bar induction and bar recursion for continuous functions with continuous moduli

We compare Brouwer's bar theorem and Spector's bar recursion for the lowest type in the context of constructive reverse mathematics. To this end, we reformulate bar recursion as a logical principle stating the existence of a bar recursor for every function which serves as the stopping condition of bar recursion. We then show that the decidable bar induction is equivalent to the existence of a bar recursor for every continuous function from ${\mathbb{N}}^{\mathbb{N}}$ to $\mathbb{N}$ with a continuous modulus. We also introduce fan recursion, the bar recursion for binary trees, and show that the decidable fan theorem is equivalent to the existence of a fan recursor for every continuous function from ${\{0,1\}}^{\mathbb{N}}$ to $\mathbb{N}$ with a continuous modulus. The equivalence for bar induction holds over the extensional version of intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types augmented with the characteristic principles of Gödel's Dialectica interpretation. On the other hand, we show the equivalence for fan theorem without using such extra principles.     

Differential algebras in codifferential categories

Differential categories were introduced by Blute, Cockett, and Seely as categorical models of differential linear logic and have since led to abstract formulations of many notions involving differentiation such as the directional derivative, differential forms, smooth manifolds, De Rham cohomology, etc. In this paper we study the generalization of differential algebras to the context of differential categories by introducing $\mathsf{T}$-differential algebras, which can be seen as special cases of Blute, Lucyshyn-Wright, and O'Neill's notion of $\mathsf{T}$-derivations. As such, $\mathsf{T}$-differential algebras are axiomatized by the chain rule and as a consequence we obtain both the higher-order Leibniz rule and the Faà di Bruno formula for the higher-order chain rule. We also construct both free and cofree $\mathsf{T}$-differential algebras for suitable codifferential categories and discuss power series of $\mathsf{T}$-algebras.     

Existential monadic second order logic of undirected graphs: The Le Bars conjecture is false

In 2001, J.-M. Le Bars disproved the zero-one law (that says that every sentence from a certain logic is either true asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.), or false a.a.s.) for existential monadic second order sentences (EMSO) on undirected graphs. He proved that there exists an EMSO sentence ? such that $\mathsf{P}(G_n??)$ does not converge as $n\to \infty$ (here, the probability distribution is uniform over the set of all graphs on the labeled set of vertices $\{1,\dots ,n\}$). In the same paper, he conjectured that, for EMSO sentences with 2 first order variables, the zero-one law holds. In this paper, we disprove this conjecture.     

The expressive power of k-ary exclusion logic

In this paper we study the expressive power of k-ary exclusion logic, EXC[k], that is obtained by extending first order logic with k-ary exclusion atoms. It is known that without arity bounds exclusion logic is equivalent with dependence logic. By observing the translations, we see that the expressive power of EXC[k] lies in between k-ary and ($k+1$)-ary dependence logics. We will show that, at least in the case when $k=1$, both of these inclusions are proper.In a recent work by the author it was shown that k-ary inclusion-exclusion logic is equivalent with k-ary existential second order logic, ESO[k]. We will show that, on the level of sentences, it is possible to simulate inclusion atoms with exclusion atoms, and in this way express ESO[k]-sentences by using only k-ary exclusion atoms. For this translation we also need to introduce a novel method for “unifying” the values of certain variables in a team. As a consequence, EXC[k] captures ESO[k] on the level of sentences, and we obtain a strict arity hierarchy for exclusion logic. It also follows that k-ary inclusion logic is strictly weaker than EXC[k].Finally we use similar techniques to formulate a translation from ESO[k] to k-ary inclusion logic with an alternative strict semantics. Consequently, for any arity fragment of inclusion logic, strict semantics is strictly more expressive than lax semantics.