Liquidity risks on power exchanges: a generalized Nash equilibrium model

The extreme volatility of electricity prices makes their financial derivatives important instruments for asset managers. Even if the volume of derivative contracts traded on Power Exchanges has been growing since the inception of the restructuring of the sector, electricity remains considerably less liquid than other commodity markets. This paper assesses the effect of limited liquidity in power exchanges using an equilibrium model where agents cannot hedge up to their desired level. Mathematically, the problem is formulated as a two stage stochastic Generalized Nash Equilibrium with possibly multiple equilibria. Computing a large panel of solutions, we show how the risk premium and players profits are affected by illiquidity. We also show that the illiquidity in the FTR market affects the trades in the electricity futures market.     

Equilibrium prices supported by dual price functions in markets with non-convexities

The issue of finding market clearing prices in markets with non-convexities has had a renewed interest due to the deregulation of the electricity sector. In the day-ahead electricity market, equilibrium prices are calculated based on bids from generators and consumers. In most of the existing markets, several generation technologies are present, some of which have considerable non-convexities, such as capacity limitations and large start-up costs. In this paper we present equilibrium prices composed of a commodity price and an uplift charge. The prices are based on the generation of a separating valid inequality that supports the optimal resource allocation. In the case when the sub-problem generated as the integer variables are held fixed to their optimal values possess the integrality property, the generated prices are also supported by non-linear price functions that are the basis for integer programming duality.     

Implicit collusion and individual market power in electricity markets

Wholesale electricity markets may not produce competitive outcomes, either as a result of the exercise of market power, or through problems of implicit collusion. In comparison with the great amount of attention paid to issues of market power, the problems of implicit collusion have not been extensively studied. In this paper, we use a coevolutionary approach to explore the effect of the price elasticity of demand, capacity and forward contracts on implicit collusion in a duopoly. We will demonstrate that implicit collusion has the most importance in market conditions under which there is an intermediate amount of market power. Thus markets which are either highly competitive or in which one or both of the two generators can exercise considerable market power, are also markets in which implicitly collusive outcomes are less likely to arise.     

Financial transmission rights in convex pool markets

This paper studies financial transmission rights in electricity pool markets with nodal pricing. We prove that simultaneous feasibility entails revenue adequacy in a general framework of convex optimization, and show by counterexample as to how this result might fail in the absence of convexity.     

Modelling the effects of interconnection between electricity markets subject to uncertainty

Interconnecting distinct electricity markets by adding a new transmission line affects the outcomes in these markets in a complicated way when there is uncertainty in demand or participant behaviour. We use market distribution functions to examine the effects of interconnection using a single transmission line under the assumption that this line has a differentiable loss function and agents in each of the interconnected markets do not change their behaviour in response to the interconnection. We also show how the case with capacity constraints on flows can be represented with appropriately formulated loss functions. We give analytical formulae for computing market outcomes when the uncertain events in the markets being connected are statistically independent, and show by example how to compute these outcomes when these events are correlated.     

Multistage stochastic portfolio optimisation in deregulated electricity markets using linear decision rules

The deregulation of electricity markets increases the financial risk faced by retailers who procure electric energy on the spot market to meet their customers’ electricity demand. To hedge against this exposure, retailers often hold a portfolio of electricity derivative contracts. In this paper, we propose a multistage stochastic mean-variance optimisation model for the management of such a portfolio. To reduce computational complexity, we apply two approximations: we aggregate the decision stages and solve the resulting problem in linear decision rules (LDR). The LDR approach consists of restricting the set of recourse decisions to those affine in the history of the random parameters. When applied to mean-variance optimisation models, it leads to convex quadratic programs. Since their size grows typically only polynomially with the number of periods, they can be efficiently solved. Our numerical experiments illustrate the value of adaptivity inherent in the LDR method and its potential for enabling scalability to problems with many periods.     

An optimization problem in the electricity market

New types of optimization problems are faced by the generating companies that operate on deregulated electricity markets. The characteristics of these problems depend on the various market structures. In the framework of the recently settled Italian electricity market, one of these new problems is the transition from hourly energy programs, defined by the market, to more detailed power generation dispatches, defined for intervals of 15 min. Such a more detailed plan is needed on the one hand by the national system operator (Terna, Rete Elettrica Nazionale) for the assessment of power system stability and security, and on the other hand by the power plant operators for its implementation. The transition procedure should respect the hourly energy constraints and take the main operating constraints of the generating units into account. The paper presents possible solutions of the problem through linear optimization models and reports computational results on real-world instances.      

Risk management in power markets: The Hedging value of production flexibility

Since the 1990s power markets are being restructured worldwide and nowadays electrical power is traded as a commodity. The liberalization and with it the uncertainty in gas, fuel and electrical power prices requires an effective management of production facilities and financial contracts. Thereby derivatives build essential instruments to exchange volume as well as price risks. The challenge for participants in the newly competitive market environment is how to design, price and hedge derivative contracts in particular combination with the flexibility embedded in dispatch strategies of production assets. Accordingly, an adequate basis for management and investment decisions is needed which responds to the highly complex market situation.     

Bidding in sequential electricity markets: The Nordic case

For electricity market participants trading in sequential markets with differences in price levels and risk exposure, it is relevant to analyze the potential of coordinated bidding. We consider a Nordic power producer who engages in the day-ahead spot market and the hour-ahead balancing market. In both markets, clearing prices and dispatched volumes are unknown at the time of bidding. However, in the balancing market, the market participant faces an additional risk of not being dispatched. Taking into account the sequential clearing of these markets and the gradual realization of market prices, we formulate the bidding problem as a multi-stage stochastic program. We investigate whether higher risk exposure may cause hesitation to bid into the balancing market. Furthermore, we quantify the gain from coordinated bidding, and by deriving bounds on this gain, assess the performance of alternative bidding strategies used in practice.     

Strategic bidding of offer curves: An agent-based approach to exploring supply curve equilibria

We model a market in which suppliers bid step-function offer curves using agent-based modeling. Our model is an abstraction of electricity markets where step-function offer curves are given to an independent system operator that manages the auctions in electricity markets. Positing an elementary and computationally accessible learning model, Probe and Adjust, we present analytic results that characterize both the behavior of the learning model and the properties of step-function equilibria. Thus, we have developed a framework for validating agent-based models prior to using them in situations that are too complicated to be analyzed using traditional economic theory. In addition, we demonstrate computationally that, by using alternative policies, even simple agents can achieve monopoly rewards for themselves by pursuing more industry-oriented strategies. This raises the issue of how participants in oligopolistic markets actually behave.     

Agent-based analysis of technological diversification and specialization in electricity markets

This paper develops a model-based analysis of technological market structure evolution in electricity markets. This is done through the development of a power plant trading game that, via computational learning, simulates how players coordinate their behaviour in buying and selling power generation assets. In particular, we look at the question of how market performance depends upon the different technological types of plant owned by the generators, and whether, through the strategic adaptation of their power plant portfolios, there is a tendency for the market to evolve into concentrations of specialized or diversified companies.     

Joint Modelling of Gas and Electricity Spot Prices

Abstract

The recent liberalization of electricity and gas markets has resulted in the growth of energy exchanges and modelling problems. In this article, we jointly model gas and electricity spot prices using a mean-reverting model that fits the correlation structures for the two commodities. The dynamics are based on Ornstein processes with parameterized diffusion coefficients. Moreover, using the empirical distributions of the spot prices, we derive a class of such parameterized diffusions that captures the most salient statistical properties: stationarity, spikes and heavy-tailed distributions. The associated calibration procedure is based on standard and efficient statistical tools. We calibrate the model on French market for electricity and on UK market for gas, and then we simulate some trajectories that reproduce well the observed prices behaviour. Finally, we illustrate the importance of the correlation structure and of the presence of spikes by measuring the risk on a power plant portfolio.     

Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms

We compare two alternative mechanisms for capping prices in two-settlement electricity markets. With sufficient lead time, forward market prices are implicitly capped by competitive pressure of potential entry that will occur when forward prices rise above some backstop price. Another more direct approach is to cap spot prices through a regulatory intervention. In this paper we explore the implications of these two alternative mechanisms in a two-settlement Cournot equilibrium framework. We formulate the market equilibrium as a stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) capturing congestion effects, probabilistic contingencies and horizontal market power. As an illustrative test case, we use the 53-bus Belgian electricity network with representative generator costs but hypothetical demand and ownership structure. Compared to a price-uncapped two-settlement system, a forward cap increases firms’ incentives for forward contracting, whereas a spot cap reduces such incentives. Moreover, in both cases, more forward contracts are committed as the generation resource ownership structure becomes more diversified.     

Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market

In this paper we introduce an asymmetric model of continuous electricity auctions with limited production capacity and bounded supply functions. The strategic bidding is studied with this model by means of an electricity market game. We prove that for every electricity market game with continuous cost functions a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists. In particular, we focus on the behavior of producers in the Spanish electricity market. We consider a very simple form for the Spanish electricity market: an oligopoly consisting just of independent hydro-electric power production units in a single wet period. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the Spanish electricity market game always exists.     

Market implied volatilities for defaultable bonds

Typically, implied volatilities for defaultable instruments are not available in the financial market since quotations related to options on defaultable bonds or on credit default swaps are usually not quoted by brokers. However, an estimate of their volatilities is needed for pricing purposes. In this paper, we provide a methodology to infer market implied volatilities for defaultable bonds using equity implied volatilities and CDS spreads quoted by the market in relation to a specific issuer. The theoretical framework we propose is based on the Merton’s model under stochastic interest rates where the short rate is assumed to follow the Hull–White model. A numerical analysis is provided to illustrate the calibration process to be performed starting from financial market data. The market implied volatility calibrated according to the proposed methodology could be used to evaluate options where the underlying is a risky bond, i.e. callable bond or other types of credit-risk sensitive financial instruments.

     

Evaluating Individual Market Power in Electricity Markets via Agent-Based Simulation

We use agent-based simulation in a coordination game to analyse the possibility of market power abuse in a competitive electricity market. The context of this was a real application to the England and Wales electricity market as part of a Competition Commission Inquiry into whether two particular generators could profitably influence wholesale prices. The research contributions of this paper are both in the areas of market power and market design policy issues for electricity markets, and in the methodological use of large industry-wide evolutionary simulation models.     

基于GAS t-Copula模型的金融市场非对称风险溢出效应测度研究

准确测度金融风险溢出效应对于金融风险管理和构建投资组合具有重要意义,而金融市场之间的非线性及动态相关结构一直是风险溢出效应研究中的难点问题之一。本文通过引入GAS t-copula模型与CoVaR方法,结合能够刻画重要典型事实特征的边缘分布模型,构建了金融市场间的风险溢出效应测度模型,以中国内地等五个股市为研究对象,测度美国股市对中国内地等四个重要股市的风险溢出效应,以检验模型的可靠性与准确性。实证结果表明:中国内地等四个股市与美国股市之间呈现出显著为正且时变相关结构,随着金融危机的爆发,相关系数逐渐增加达到最大值;中国内地等四个股市受到美国股市的风险溢出效应呈现出非对称特征,即下跌风险溢出效应强度显著大于上涨风险溢出效应;中国内地股市受到的金融风险溢出效应显著小于香港、日本以及英国股市。     

Stochastic measures of arbitrage

Empirical research has provided evidence supporting the existence of arbitrage opportunities in real financial markets although market imperfections are often the main reason to explain these empirical deviations. Consequently, recent literature has turned the attention to imperfect markets in order to extend the most significant results on asset pricing. This paper develops several stochastic measures providing relative arbitrage earnings available in a financial market. The measures allow us to take into account different type of frictions. They are introduced by means of several dual pairs of vector optimization problems. Primal problems permit us to characterize the arbitrage absence even in an imperfect market and they also provide optimal arbitrage portfolios if the arbitrage absence fails. Dual ones allow us to extend the risk-neutral valuation methodology for imperfect and noarbitrage free markets and provide new interpretations for the measures in terms of “frictions effect” or “committed errors” in the valuation process. Partially funded by Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid (ref: CAM 07T/0027/2000) and Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (ref: BEC2000-1388-C04)     

基于R-vine-copula-CoVaR模型的金融市场风险溢出效应研究

为了挖掘国际金融市场与中国金融市场的风险溢出效应,本文首先通过ARJI-GARCH模型捕捉单个市场收益率的跳跃等典型事实特征,然后采用最大生成树(Maximum Spanning Tree,MST)算法优化的R-vine来刻画多维金融资产的复杂相依结构;最后构建R-vine-copula-CoVaR模型,测度了国际原油市场、国际黄金市场、美国股票市场与中国股票市场、外汇市场之间的风险溢出效应。实证结果表明:各市场之间均存在双向风险溢出效应,但溢出程度差别很大,国际黄金市场是风险溢出的最大爆发源,仅有中国外汇市场与中国股票市场、国际黄金市场间存在负向风险溢出;市场之间的双向风险溢出效应呈非对称性,国际原油市场与黄金市场的风险溢出效应远大于中国股票市场与外汇市场风险溢出效应;Rosenb-Latt检验表明基于R藤的CoVaR风险溢出测度更具有灵活性和有效性;后验测试结果表明R-vine-copula-CoVaR模型能有效地测度国际金融市场对中国金融市场风险溢出效应,而对中国金融市场风险溢出效应的CoVaR测度存在被高估的可能。