售后赔偿纠纷中的最终报价仲裁研究

在商品消费领域,售后赔偿纠纷问题越来越普遍,解决这些纠纷问题常常耗时耗力,效率低下。本文针对这一情形,研究了如何使用最终报价仲裁方法来解决这类问题。在最终报价仲裁方法里,仲裁人有一个自己的理想裁决值。我们根据现实情况,讨论了协商双方认为仲裁人的理想裁决值所可能发生的三种情形;然后基于争议双方的期望效用最大化原则,从理论上分析了不同情形下协商双方的最优报价策略。本文提出的结论可对实际的仲裁问题提供有效的参考。     

Logrolling and budget allocation games

In this paper we approach the concept of logrolling by examining a voting system where choices are made among sets of competing projects as a game in characteristic function form. We translate the question: “Will there be prices for votes on different projects which clear the market?” into a different, but equivalent question: “Is the formal game we have described amarket game?” We show that in general the answer is no, unless all voters have virtually the same preferences.     

Arbitration of two-party disputes under ignorance

When an arbitrator lacks complete information about the dispute in question, he may have to turn to the disputants themselves to provide information. If they know how the information is to be used, they may have incentives to hide the truth. By using the players reports as checks on each other, a completely ignorant arbitrator of a dispute between two completely informed players can induce truthful revelation in the sense that the truth is a Nash equilibrium of the game which the arbitrator's decision process imposes on the players. Such a scheme may be used in conjunction with any one from a class of functions which select Pareto-optimal, individually-rational outcomes in two-person normal-form games.     

Conflict dissolution by reframing game payoffs using linear perturbations

Human beings have a prevailing drive to achieve their self-interest goals or equilibrium states, which may subsume their social interests. An ideal working environment or cooperative game situation would be one in which each participant or player maximizes his/her own interest while maximizing his/her contribution to the collective group interest. This paper addresses the feasibility, methods, and bounds for reframing a generaln-person game into an ideal game in which full cooperation or a targeted solution can be induced and maintained by the players' self-interest maximization. Criteria for good reframing are introduced. Monotonic games, self-interest cooperative and noncooperative games, and a decomposition theory of general games are also introduced to facilitate the study. It is shown that everyn-person game can be written as the sum of a self-interest cooperative game and a self-interest noncooperative game. Everyn-person game can be reframed so that full cooperation can be achieved by the players' self-interest maximization. Everyn-person game can be reframed so that a targeted solution can be obtained and maintained through the players' self-interest maximization.     

A note on hierarchies in weighted voting games and partitions

Weighted voting games (WVGs) model situations where voters, possibly controlling different numbers of votes, vote yes or no on a proposition. A proposition passes if and only if the number of yes votes meets or exceeds a quota \(q\). Each winning coalition is a partition of an integer greater than or equal to \(q\), with parts taken from the set of all weights for that game. Results about WVGs are here interpreted as results about partitions.     

On Simple MIX game

We consider zero-sum game which is called Simple MIX game. Each of two players (I and II) draws a number (x andy respectively) according to a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. After observing his number each player can then choose to offer or not offer to exchange his number for the other player's number. Conditions for an exchange are the following: 1) both players must offer for a trade to occur with certainty; 2) if only one player offers, a trade occurs with probabilityp. A player's payoff is equal to 1, 0 or — 1 if the value of the number which he finally gets is greater, equal or less than the number of his opponent. In the present paper we shall investigate Simple MIX game in which both of the players can obtain additional information about the opponent's number. Besides, we consider two-stage variant of this game.     

Qualified voting systems

Voting systems are defined by three components: the set of votes that individuals are allowed to cast (that is, the instructions voters receive on how to fill in the ballot), a support function (that transforms ballots into support or votes), and an outcome function (which states how to aggregate those votes). In this paper, we investigate how these components interact. To that end, we impose two requirements on the outcome functions, called support monotonicity and limited symmetry. We identify the family of outcome functions that satisfy both properties.     

Repeated newsvendor game with transshipments under dual allocations

We study a repeated newsvendor game with transshipments. In every period n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product and independently place their inventory orders before demand realization. After observing the actual demand, each retailer decides how much of her leftover inventory or unsatisfied demand she wants to share with the other retailers. Residual inventories are then transshipped in order to meet residual demands, and dual allocations are used to distribute residual profit. Unsold inventories are salvaged at the end of the period. While in a single-shot game retailers in an equilibrium withhold their residuals, we show that it is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the retailers to share all of the residuals when the discount factor is large enough and the game is repeated infinitely many times. We also study asymptotic behavior of the retailers’ order quantities and discount factors when n is large. Finally, we provide conditions under which a system-optimal solution can be achieved in a game with n retailers, and develop a contract for achieving a system-optimal outcome when these conditions are not satisfied.     

Ultimatums in two-person bargaining with one-sided uncertainty: Offer games

In the ultimatum game with complete information a Sender proposes a division of a given amount of surplus (“pie”), which a Receiver can either accept (payoffs are distributed according to the Sender's proposal) or reject (both players earn nothing). We study another version of the ultimatum game under incomplete informaton in which the pie is drawn randomly from a commonly known distribution, the Sender knows the exact size of the pie, but the Receiver only knows her share of the pie, not the residual share requested by the Sender. The basic results are that (1) as the support of the pie distribution increases in a mean-preserving spread, the Senders make lower offers that the Receivers are less likely to reject, (2) for a given support, Senders tend to offer a lower proportion of the pie to the Receivers as the pie size grows larger, and (3) although knowing only their share of the pie, Receivers estimate its size quite accurately.     

Unanimity and the Anscombe’s paradox

We establish a new sufficient condition for avoiding a generalized Anscombe’s paradox. In a situation where votes describe positions regarding finitely many yes-or-no issues, the Anscombe’s α-paradox holds if more than α% of the voters disagree on a majority of issues with the outcome of issue-wise majority voting. We define the level of unanimity of a set of votes as the number of issues minus the maximal Hamming distance between two votes. We compute for the case of large electorates the exact level of unanimity above which the Anscombe’s α-paradox never holds, whatever the distribution of individuals among votes.     

Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification

Many axiomatic characterizations of values for cooperative games invoke axioms which evaluate the consequences of removing an arbitrary player. Balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980) and balanced cycle contributions (Kamijo and Kongo, 2010) are two well-known examples of such axioms. We revisit these characterizations by nullifying a player instead of deleting her/him from a game. The nullification (Béal et al., 2014a) of a player is obtained by transforming a game into a new one in which this player is a null player, i.e. the worth of the coalitions containing this player is now identical to that of the same coalition without this player. The degree with which our results are close to the original results in the literature is connected to the fact that the targeted value satisfies the null player out axiom (Derks and Haller, 1999). We also revisit the potential approach (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) similarly.     

On equilibria in finite games

We are concerned with Nash equilibrium points forn-person games. It is proved that, given any real algebraic numberα, there exists a 3-person game with rational data which has a unique equilibrium point andα is the equilibrium payoff for some player. We also present a method which allows us to reduce an arbitraryn-person game to a 3-person one, so that a number of questions about generaln-person games can be reduced to consideration of the special 3-person case. Finally, a completely mixed game, where the equilibrium set is a manifold of dimension one, is constructed.     

A climbing girl's reflections about angles

The main research question in this paper is whether a climbing discourse can be a resource for a school-geometry discourse. The text is based on a 12-year old girl's story from an exciting climbing trip during her summer holiday. The girl uncovers some of her knowledge that had been invisible to her; she is guided to see some relations between her climbing and her understanding of angles. In the beginning, this girl believes her story does not concern angles at all. The tools for uncovering angles in her story are based on different levels of visibility and objects of the climbing discourse combined with different conceptions of space. The girl develops her consciousness about angles as natural elements in her climbing activity and she is guided to see the angle as an object of her climbing discourse.     

A construction for t-fold perfect authentication codes with arbitration

Authentication codes with arbitration protect against deceptions from the transmitter and the receiver as well as that from the opponent. An authentication code with arbitration is t-fold perfect if the numbers of decoding rules and encoding rules meet the information-theoretic lower bounds. Pei (Message authentication codes (in Chinese). USCT, Hefei, 2009) pointed out that there has not yet been able to construct t-fold perfect authentication codes with arbitration for \(t > 2\) . In this paper, we define a new design, perfect strong strict restricted partially balanced t-design, and prove that the existence of perfect strong strict restricted partially balanced t-designs implies the existence of t-fold perfect authentication codes with arbitration. Further, we obtain some new infinite classes of t-fold perfect authentication codes with arbitration.     

A generalized decomposable multiattribute utility function

In this paper a generalized decomposable multiattribute utility function (MAUF) is developed. It is demonstrated that this new MAUF structure is more general than other well-known MAUF structures, such as additive, multiplicative, and multilinear. Therefore, it is more flexible and does not require that the decision maker be consistent with restrictive assumptions such as preferential independence conditions about his/her preferences. We demonstrate that this structure does not require any underlying assumption and hence solves the interdependence among attributes. Hence there is no need for verification of its structure. Several useful extensions and properties for this generalized decomposable MAUF are developed which simplify its structure or assessment. The concept of utility efficiency is developed to identify efficient alternatives when there exists partial information on the scaling constants of an assumed MAUF. It is assumed that the structure (decomposition) of the MAUF is known and the partial information about the scaling constants of the decision maker is in the form of bounds or constraints. For the generalized decomposable structure, linear programming is sufficient to solve all ensuing problems. Some examples are provided.     

Customer equilibrium and optimal strategies in Markovian queues in series

We consider series of M/M/m queues with strategic customer behavior. Customers arrive to the first queue and decide whether to enter the system or balk and, if they enter, up to which queue to proceed before departing. Each customer makes an independent decision, with the objective of maximizing her total net benefit, which is equal to the value of service minus a cost due to expected delay. We formulate the customer decision as a game and identify the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, which is expressed in a backward recursive form. We also analyze the problem of maximizing the total customer welfare and establish the relationship between the equilibrium and the welfare maximizing strategies.     

Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters

Let us suppose that certain committee is going to decide, using some fixed voting rules, either to accept or to reject a proposal that affects your interests. From your perception about each voter’s position, you can make an a priori estimation of the probability of the proposal being accepted. Wishing to increase this probability of acceptance before the votes are cast, assume further that you are able to convince (at least) one voter to improve his/her perception in favor of the proposal. The question is: which voters should be persuaded in order to get the highest possible increase in the probability of acceptance? In other words, which are the optimal persuadable voters? To answer this question a measure of “circumstantial power” is considered in this paper, which is useful to identify optimal persuadable voters. Three preorderings in the set of voters, based on the voting rules, are defined and they are used for finding optimal persuadable voters, even in the case that only a qualitative ranking of each voter’s inclination for the proposal has been made.     

Risk assessment for infectious disease and its impact on voluntary vaccination behavior in social networks

Achievement of the herd immunity is essential for preventing the periodic spreading of an infectious disease such as the flu. If vaccination is voluntary, as vaccination coverage approaches the critical level required for herd immunity, there is less incentive for individuals to be vaccinated; this results in an increase in the number of so-called “free-riders” who craftily avoid infection via the herd immunity and avoid paying any cost. We use a framework originating in evolutionary game theory to investigate this type of social dilemma with respect to epidemiology and the decision of whether to be vaccinated. For each individual in a population, the decision on vaccination is associated with how one assesses the risk of infection. In this study, we propose a new risk-assessment model in a vaccination game when an individual updates her strategy, she compares her own payoff to a net payoff obtained by averaging a collective payoff over individuals who adopt the same strategy as that of a randomly selected neighbor. In previous studies of vaccination games, when an individual updates her strategy, she typically compares her payoff to the payoff of a randomly selected neighbor, indicating that the risk for changing her strategy is largely based on the behavior of one other individual, i.e., this is an individual-based risk assessment. However, in our proposed model, risk assessment by any individual is based on the collective success of a strategy and not on the behavior of any one other individual. For strategy adaptation, each individual always takes a survey of the degree of success of a certain strategy that one of her neighbors has adopted, i.e., this is a strategy-based risk assessment. Using computer simulations, we determine how these two different risk-assessment methods affect the spread of an infectious disease over a social network. The proposed model is found to benefit the population, depending on the structure of the social network and cost of vaccination. Our results suggest that individuals (or governments) should understand the structure of their social networks at the regional level, and accordingly, they should adopt an appropriate risk-assessment methodology as per the demands of the situation.     

Game chromatic number of strong product graphs

The graph coloring game is a two-player game in which the two players properly color an uncolored vertex of G alternately. The first player wins the game if all vertices of G are colored, and the second wins otherwise. The game chromatic number of a graph G is the minimum integer k such that the first player has a winning strategy for the graph coloring game on G with k colors. There is a lot of literature on the game chromatic number of graph products, e.g., the Cartesian product and the lexicographic product. In this paper, we investigate the game chromatic number of the strong product of graphs, which is one of major graph products. In particular, we completely determine the game chromatic number of the strong product of a double star and a complete graph. Moreover, we estimate the game chromatic number of some King's graphs, which are the strong products of two paths.     

The simplified updating rule in the formalization of digital educational games

Competence-based Knowledge Space Theory (CbKST) has been proven to be a very well-fitting basis for realizing personalization in technology-enhanced learning. Especially in the area of game-based learning, however, some extensions and improvements are needed.Personalization in a serious game cannot be regarded simply as the selection of game assets according to the individual learner's current competences but it must also pay heed to the up-keeping of a storyline, it must be ensured that no part of the story is omitted that may be necessary to understand a later part. Therefore, a CbKST-compatible Markovian model for storytelling is proposed.A second issue is the ongoing, non-invasive assessment of the learner's current competences during the game. Every action of the learner within the game should be taken into account for the competence assessment, and the assessment must be done in real-time, i.e. there must not be any delay caused by the assessment which would interrupt the flow of the game. A simplified update procedure for competence assessment within CbKST is suggested which can solve this issue, and simulation results are presented comparing the new procedure with the classical one.