An empirical study on the Lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions

This paper presents an empirical study on the Lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions. Three issues are evaluated: (i) the specification of the market share response model; (ii) the effect of inflation on the estimation of the response model; and (iii) the performance of competitive strategies. It is shown that (a) the square root function that is used in previous studies is often inappropriate to characterize the market share response model; (b) market share variations are more responsive to current advertising expenditures; (c) closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies are better competitive advertising strategies for firms to maximize profits than open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies; and (d), finally, general perfect equilibria Nash equilibrium strategies developed by Case are usually not good competitive advertising strategies for firms to maximize profits.     

An oligopoly model of dynamic advertising competition

An oligopoly model is presented that allows the determination of feedback Nash equilibrium advertising strategies for an oligopoly. Analyses of symmetric and asymmetric oligopolies with the model show that unit contribution and advertising effectiveness have positive effects on a competitor’s own advertising and steady-state sales, while discount rate and decay rate have negative effects. An asymmetric analysis further shows that unit contribution and advertising effectiveness affect positively, and discount rate and decay rate negatively, a competitor’s rivals’ advertising, but have effects in opposite directions regarding rivals’ steady-state sales. The symmetric and asymmetric analyses also show that steady-state sales per competitor decline with the number of competitors in the oligopoly, while total oligopoly steady-state sales increase. The model is applied empirically to the triopolistic competition involving Anheuser-Busch, SABMiller, and Molson Coors in the beer industry.     

Cooperative advertising in a distribution channel with fairness concerns

Cooperative (co-op) advertising has been widely used in practice and employed as a strategy to improve the performance of a distribution channel. It is known from the existing models that co-op advertising could not achieve the channel coordination (i.e., maximize the total channel profit). In this paper, we consider a distribution channel consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and investigate the effect of the retailer’s fairness concerns. Applying the equilibrium analysis, we obtain the following results: (1) Channel coordination can be achieved if the retailer has fairness concerns and model parameters satisfy certain conditions. (2) Although both channel members become better off with co-op advertising if neither channel member has fairness concerns, we find situations where co-op advertising brings detrimental effects to the retailer if the retailer has fairness concerns. (3) The retailer’s fairness concerns may increase or decrease the equilibrium participation rate, the equilibrium advertising effort, and the equilibrium profit of the manufacturer and the whole channel. (4) We identify the conditions under which the effectiveness of co-op advertising can be improved or reduced by the retailer’s fairness concerns. As long as co-op advertising can bring extra profit to the manufacturer, the retailer’s fairness concerns could improve the effectiveness of the co-op advertising. (5) There exists a Pareto improvement for the profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer when a retailer without fairness concerns becomes fair-minded.     

A network equilibrium framework for Internet advertising: Models,qualitative analysis,and algorithms

In this paper, we develop a network equilibrium framework for the modeling and analysis of competitive firms engaged in Internet advertising among multiple websites. The model allows for the determination of both the equilibrium online advertising budget as well as the advertising expenditures on the different websites. We then specialize the model to the case of fixed online budgets for the firms. The governing equilibrium conditions of both models are shown to satisfy finite-dimensional variational inequalities. We present qualitative properties of the solution patterns as well as computational procedures that exploit the underlying abstract network structure of these problems. The models and algorithms are illustrated with numerical examples. This paper adds to the growing literature of the application of network-based techniques derived from operations research to the advertising/marketing arena.     

Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer–retailer channel

Cooperative advertising is a practice that a manufacturer pays retailers a portion of the local advertising cost in order to induce sales. Cooperative advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs of channel members. Nevertheless, most studies to date on cooperative advertising have assumed that the market demand is only influenced by advertising expenditures but not by retail price. This paper addresses channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two-member distribution channel. We establish and compare two models: a non-cooperative, leader–follower game and a cooperative game. We develop propositions and insights from the comparison of these models. The cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher channel-wide profits than the non-cooperative model with these features: (a) the retailer price is lower to consumers; and (b) the advertising efforts are higher for all channel members. We identify the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra profits.     

不同决策模式下的双渠道供应链合作广告博弈分析

本文研究了双渠道供应链中非合作广告模式、合作广告模式和战略联盟模式下的合作广告问题,给出了不同决策模式下的均衡解。对比分析发现:战略联盟模式中品牌广告和零售商广告投入水平最高,网络广告投入水平最低且零售渠道的产品需求最高。合作广告模式和战略联盟模式中的系统收益与广告比率负相关,与产品网络适应度正相关。     

Optimal Control of a Logarithmic Advertising Model

A logarithmic advertising model is posed and solved for an optimal dynamic advertising policy for both finite and infinite horizon cases by using optimal control theory. In the case of the infinite horizon, the optimal long-run stationary equilibrium rate of advertising is obtained. It is shown that the optimal advertising policy is independent of the initial level of sales for the logarithmic model.     

A goodwill model with predatory advertising

We investigate the dynamic advertising policies of two competing firms in a duopolistic industry, assuming a predatory phenomenon between their advertising campaigns. The resulting model is a differential game which is not linear-quadratic. We show that there exists a Markovian Nash equilibrium, and that it leads to time constant advertising strategies. According to this model, predatory advertising produces a negative externality: the interference between the advertising campaigns decreases the total demand of the market.     

On the superiority of pulsing under a concave advertising market potential function

The authors study the superiority of advertising pulsing policy (turning advertising on and off in a cyclic fashion) over its uniform (constant spending) counterpart that costs the same under the assumption that sales dynamics follow a modified Vidale–Wolfe aggregate advertising model. The authors show that pulsing can be superior if the product of the concave market potential function and the linear or concave advertising response function is convex in advertising. Similar to previous studies in the literature, the average undiscounted profit over the infinite planning horizon is considered as a performance measure according to which alternative advertising pulsation policies are compared.     

Optimal advertising pulsation policies: a dynamic programming approach

This study formulates and solves an advertising pulsation problem for a monopolistic firm using dynamic programming (DP). The firm aims at maximising profit through an optimal allocation of the advertising budget in terms of rectangular pulses over a finite planning horizon. Aggregate sales response to the advertising effort is assumed to be governed by a modified version of the Vidale–Wolfe model in continuous time proposed by Little. Using a numerical example in which a planning horizon of one year is divided into one, two through ten equal time periods, computing routines are developed to solve 150 DP problems. Computational results show among other findings that the performance yielded by the DP policy dominates the uniform advertising policy (constant spending) for a concave advertising response function and the advertising pulsing policy (turning advertising on and off) for a linear or convex response function.     

The impact of product recall on advertising decisions and firm profit while envisioning crisis or being hazard myopic

The occurrence of a product recall can have a disastrous effect on the firm responsible for the recall. Any major recall by a firm can negatively affect the goodwill of the firm. Consequently, the firm incurs a substantial indirect cost due to decline in sales and loss in profit. Moreover, a competitor’s opportunistic reaction can intensify the recalling firm’s damages. Strategic use of advertising recovers lost goodwill and mitigates the damages made by a product recall. In this paper, using a goodwill based model under a differential game framework, we analyze the equilibrium strategies of two competing manufacturers when either one firm or both can issue a product recall at a random time, and investigate (i) the firms’ equilibrium advertising strategies (ii) analyze the impact of the recall on a firm’s profit (iii) introduce and investigate the effect of “hazard myopia” (a firm’s inability to foresee the crisis likelihood) on a firm’s advertising decisions and profit. Our study finds that the equilibrium advertising strategies of competing firms depend on the impact and likelihood of the recall. Notably, we find that when both the firms are focal firms without the prior knowledge of who will recall first in a planning horizon, adjusting optimal advertising at an appropriate time is essential. Surprisingly, a product-recall with a minor impact can increase the focal firm’s long-term expected profit. On the other hand, hazard myopia can be profitable if the long-term effect of the recall is small. Our findings suggest that advertising levels of firms should differ in pre-recall and post-recall regimes depending on the impact and likelihood of the recall.     

A duopolistic model of dynamic competitive advertising

This paper proposes a differential game model of competitive advertising decisions for non-durable products by extending the Lanchester model and the Deal model of competitive advertising in the literature. The proposed model is compared empirically with the Lanchester model for model fitting and forecast accuracy. It is shown that the model is suitable for an actual market and out-performs the Lanchester model in forecast accuracy. The model provides a sensible modeling alternative to the Lanchester model for the study of dynamic competitive advertising decisions. Necessary and sufficient conditions for open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium solutions to the model are discussed. A numerical algorithm for open-loop and closed-loop Nash strategies to the model is developed.     

National and store brand advertising strategies

As the propensity of premium store brands (SBs) increases, retailers must consider different ways to drive sales besides promotional strategies. With this in mind, we consider a national brand (NB) and a (premium) SB co-existing in a market. Each brand has to decide the amount to invest in advertising its product and the prices to charge its customers, which can be determined separately or in unison. When either advertising expenditures or pricing decisions are set, each brand must keep in mind that the advertising efforts and revenue may spillover between the two brands, customers who intend to purchase the NB may end up purchasing the SB and vice versa. We derive an analytical model of the situations described and characterize equilibrium advertising decisions. We find that the characteristics of a premium SB may depend on which marketing/promoting instrument (advertising or pricing) is the primary method for driving demand; and in some situations an NB may be better off to not advertise at all and instead let the premium SB carry out all of the advertising.     

Stochastic diffusion models with advertising and word-of-mouth effects

This paper presents a stochastic diffusion model which incorporates advertising word-of-mouth effects. The model defines a 3 variate stochastic process based on explicit assumptions regarding consumer behavior and consumers' response to advertising. The model generalizes a wide variety of advertising models and in addition includes several classes of consumers, interaction effects between these consumers and, of course, a stochastic framework that may be used for assessing the risk implications of advertising policies and for empirical analyses purposes.     

On a cooperative advertising model for a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer

, , ,  and  recently studied a game-theoretic model for cooperative advertising in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. However, the sales-volume (demand) function considered in this model can become negative for some values of the decision variables, and in fact, this does happen for the proposed Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium solutions. Yue et al. (2006) acknowledge the negativity problem and suggest two constraints to fix it; however, they do not incorporate these constraints into their mathematical analysis. In this paper, we show that the results obtained by analyzing the advertising model under the constraints suggested by Yue et al. can differ significantly from those obtained in the previous papers.     

Dynamics of competing with quality- and advertising-based goodwill

Goodwill formation is a complex process and many factors influence the formation of goodwill of a firm. The implications of advertising enabled goodwill formation are reported in several articles in the research literature. In this paper, we extend this stream of research by including quality in the goodwill formation process. We adopt a dynamic model of competition utilizing a differential game approach and derive expressions for open-loop Markovian Nash equilibrium investments in advertising and quality. The insights gained from the analysis of our model and from the equilibrium solutions are presented in the form of research propositions.     

Investigating the competitive assumption of Multinomial Logit models of brand choice by nonparametric modeling

Summary  The Multinomial Logit (MNL) model is still the only viable option to study nonlinear responsiveness of utility to covariates nonparametrically. This research investigates whether MNL structure of inter-brand competition is a reasonable assumption, so that when the utility function is estimated nonparametrically, the IIA assumption does not bias the result. For this purpose, the authors compare the performance of two comparable nonparametric choice models that differ in one aspect: one assumes MNL competitive structure and the other infers the pattern of brands? competition nonparametrically from data.     

A Competitive Advertising Model: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results

Using a modified Lanchester model, this article demonstrates that the policy of constant advertising spending is superior to a cyclic counterpart, provided that the advertising response functions of competing firms are concave. The competitive model is estimated using filter and non-filter cigarette data. The empirical results suggest the presence of over-advertising and that the relative effectiveness and elasticity of filter cigarette advertising are both higher than those of non-filter cigarette advertising.     

On the impact of initial performance on the effectiveness of advertising pulsation policies

Using a modified version of a Vidale–Wolfe model, proposed by Little, this paper examines the impact of initial sales rate on the performance of a variety of discrete, piecewise-continuous advertising policies for a finite planning horizon. The deployment of a non-discounted measure of performance reveals, irrespective of the shape of the advertising response function, that when the initial sales rate is different from zero at the beginning of the planning period: (1) a firm would be better off concentrating its advertising effort at the end rather than at the beginning of the planning period for a Blitz Policy (BP), (2) for an Advertising Pulsing/Maintenance Policy (APMP), it is more lucrative for a firm to alternate between a lower level of advertising followed by higher level (low–high) in a cyclic manner rather than to cycle the opposite way (high–low), and (3) in the presence of an initial sales rate, the pattern of the optimal advertising policy determined by dynamic programming can be significantly different from its alternative counterpart in its absence. In addition, it has been demonstrated, among other theoretical findings, that, for any given mean rate of advertising, the mean sales is bounded from below and is a decreasing function of the length of the planning horizon. Numerical examples are introduced to illustrate and reinforce the above research findings.     

Differential game approach to pricing and advertising decisions

This study proposes a model to make concurrent decisions on dynamic pricing and advertising to maximise firms' profitability over an infinite time horizon in a duopoly market. To this end, the Nerlove-Arrow pricing and advertising model is designed in the presence of shifting costs in a dynamic duopolistic competition as a differential game. The Nash equilibrium solution is defined based upon a set of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman. Four scenarios are applied for economic interpretations and the efficacy of the model.