Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism

Conversational contextualism in epistemology is characterized by four main theses: 1. the indexicality of knowledge claims thesis; 2. the attributor contextualism thesis; 3. the conversational contextualism thesis, and 4. the main thesis of contextualism according to which a knowledge claim can be true in one context and false in another context in which more stringent standards for knowledge are operant. It is argued that these theses taken together generate problems for contextualism. In particular, it is shown that there is no context in which the contextualist can truthfully claim to know her theory is true. Since these results were obtained only with principles the contextualist cannot give up—like the principle of epistemic closure and the principle that knowledge implies truth—it seems that contextualism is in need of a thoroughgoing revision if it is to become a successful epistemic theory.     

Scepticism,context and modal reasoning

I analyze some classical solutions of the skeptical argument and some of their week points (especially the contextualist solution). First I have proposed some possible improvement of the contextualist solution (the introduction of the explicit-implicit belief and knowledge distinction beside the differences in the relevance of some counter-factual alternatives). However, this solution does not block too fast jumps of the everyday context (where empirical knowledge is possible) into skeptical context (where empirical knowledge is impossible). Then I analyze some formal analogies between some modal arguments on the contingency of empirical facts (and the world as whole) and the skeptical arguments against empirical knowledge. I try to show that the skeptical conclusion “Empirical knowledge does not exist” is logically coherent with the thesis that they are empirical facts and that we have true belief on them. In order to do that without contradictions I have to accept a non-classical definition of knowledge: S knows that p:= S is not justified to allow that non-p. Knowledge and justified allowance function here as some pseudo-theoretical concepts which allow only some partial and conditional definitions by some “empirical” terms and logical conditions.     

A Priori knowledge contextualised and Benacerraf’s dilemma

In this article, I discuss Hawthorne’s contextualist solution to Benacerraf’s dilemma. He wants to find a satisfactory epistemology to go with realist ontology, namely with causally inaccessible mathematical and modal entities. I claim that he is unsuccessful. The contextualist theories of knowledge attributions were primarily developed as a response to the skeptical argument based on the deductive closure principle. Hawthorne uses the same strategy in his attempt to solve the epistemologist puzzle facing the proponents of mathematical and modal realism, but this problem is of a different nature than the skeptical one. The contextualist theory of knowledge attributions cannot help us with the question about the nature of mathematical and modal reality and how they can be known. I further argue that Hawthorne’s account does not say anything about a priori status of mathematical and modal knowledge. Later, Hawthorne adds to his account an implausible claim that in some contexts a gettierized belief counts as knowledge.     

Contextualist theories of knowledge

Contextualist theories of knowledge offer a semantic hypothesis to explain the observed contextual variation in what people say they know, and the difficulty people have resolving skeptical paradoxes. Subject or speaker relative versions make the truth conditions of “S knows that p” depend on the standards of either the knower’s context (Hawthorne and Stanley) or those of the speaker’s context (Cohen and DeRose). Speaker contextualism avoids objections to subject contextualism, but is implausible in light of evidence that “know” does not behave like an indexical. I deepen and extend these criticisms in light of recent defenses by contextualists (including Ludlow). Another difficulty is that whether certain standards are salient or intended does not entail that they are the proper standards. A normative form of contextualism on which the truth of a knowledge claim depends on the proper standards for the context is more promising, but still unsatisfactory whether the view is speaker or subject relative. I defend alternative explanations for the observed linguistic and psychological data: a pragmatic account for some cases and a cognitive account for others.¹ I presented this paper at the 2004 Bled Conference on Contextualism, sponsored by Mirabor and Northern Illinois Universities.     

On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions

We generalize the average pay-off solution proposed by Anbarci (Can J Econ 28:675–682, 1995), which depends on all the alternatives, and show that the Nash and Kalai–Smorodinsky solutions are limits of generalized average pay-off solutions. We formalize the notion of relevant alternatives and compare solutions in terms of the relevance of alternatives. I am much indebted to Roberto Serrano for his guidance and many discussions, and William Thomson for his numerous detailed suggestions for improvements. I thank Youngsub Chun, Michael Maschler, Yeneng Sun, Rajiv Vohra, Oscar Volij, Myrna Wooders, an associate editor, anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Brown University, the National University of Singapore, and the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society for valuable comments. I gratefully acknowledge research support from Brown University through an Eccleston Fellowship award.     

Two comments and a problem for David Davies’ performance theory

This paper considers the view, recently put forward by David Davies in Art and Performance, that works of art should be identified with the generative performances that result in the object, rather than with the object. It attempts to disarm two of Davies arguments by, first, providing a criterion by which the contextualist can accommodate all and only the relevant generative properties as properties of the work, and, second, providing an alternative explanation for his modal intuitions. Finally, it draws attention to Davies’ difficulties in providing a clear criterion for the identity of the work of art.     

The semantics of knowledge attributions

The basic idea of conversational contextualism is that knowledge attributions are context sensitive in that a given knowledge attribution may be true if made in one context but false if made in another, owing to differences in the attributors’ conversational contexts. Moreover, the context sensitivity involved is traced back to the context sensitivity of the word “know,” which, in turn, is commonly modelled on the case either of genuine indexicals such as “I” or “here” or of comparative adjectives such as “tall” or “rich.” But contextualism faces various problems. I argue that in order to solve these problems we need to look for another account of the context sensitivity involved in knowledge attributions and I sketch an alternative proposal.     

Interacting Parallel Constructions of Knowledge in a CAS Context

We consider the influence of a CAS context on a learner’s process of constructing a justification for the bifurcations in a logistic dynamical process. We describe how instrumentation led to cognitive constructions and how the roles of the learner and the CAS intertwine, especially close to the branching and combining of constructing actions. The CAS has a major influence on parallel constructions after branching and it facilitates combining. Hence, the CAS has the upper hand near branching points but the learner has the upper hand near combining points.     

The modality principle and work-relativity of modality

Davies argues that the ontology of artworks as performances offers a principled way of explaining work-relativity of modality. Object oriented contextualist ontologies of art (Levinson) cannot adequately address the problem of work-relativity of modal properties because they understand looseness in what counts as the same context as a view that slight differences in the work-constitutive features of provenance are work-relative. I argue that it is more in the spirit of contextualism to understand looseness as context-dependent. This points to the general problem—the context of appreciation is not robust enough to ground modal intuitions about objective entities. In general, when epistemology dictates ontology there is always a threat of anti-realism, scepticism and relativism. Davies also appeals to the modality principle—an entity’s essential properties are all and only its constitutive properties. Davies understands essentiality in a traditional way: a property P is an essential property of an object o iff o could not exist and lack P. Kit Fine has recently made a convincing case for the view that the notion of essence is not to be understood in modal terms. I explore some of the implications of this view for Davies’ modal argument for the performance theory.     

Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism

We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of doxastic justification.

Boundary in context

A contextualist account of modal assertions is sketched that makes their truth sensitive to the presuppositions of the conversation. Support for the account is mustered by considering its application to the context-sensitivity of assertions of subjunctive conditional sentences, explanation sentences, and knowledge sentences.     

Systemic decision making in AHP: a Bayesian approach

Systemic decision making is a new approach for dealing with complex multiactor decision making problems in which the actors’ individual preferences on a fixed set of alternatives are incorporated in a holistic view in accordance with the “principle of tolerance”. The new approach integrates all the preferences, even if they are encapsulated in different individual theoretical models or approaches; the only requirement is that they must be expressed as some kind of probability distribution. In this paper, assuming the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is the multicriteria technique employed to rank alternatives, the authors present a new methodology based on a Bayesian analysis for dealing with AHP systemic decision making in a local context (a single criterion). The approach integrates the individual visions of reality into a collective one by means of a tolerance distribution, which is defined as the weighted geometric mean of the individual preferences expressed as probability distributions. A mathematical justification of this distribution, a study of its statistical properties and a Monte Carlo method for drawing samples are also provided. The paper further presents a number of decisional tools for the evaluation of the acceptance of the tolerance distribution, the construction of tolerance paths that increase representativeness and the extraction of the relevant knowledge of the subjacent multiactor decisional process from a cognitive perspective. Finally, the proposed methodology is applied to the AHP-multiplicative model with lognormal errors and a case study related to a real-life experience in local participatory budgets for the Zaragoza City Council (Spain).     

On Knowing How I Feel About That—A Process-Reliabilist Approach

Human subjects seem to have a type of introspective access to their mental states that allows them to immediately judge the types and intensities of their occurrent emotions, as well as what those emotions are about or “directed at”. Such judgments manifest what I call “emotion-direction beliefs”, which, if reliably produced, may constitute emotion-direction knowledge. Many psychologists have argued that the “directed emotions” such beliefs represent have a componential structure, one that includes feelings of emotional responses and related but independent representations of what those feelings are about. I argue that such componentiality may help to explain how emotion-direction knowledge is achievable. I begin by developing a hybrid view of introspection that combines David Chalmers’ phenomenal realism with Alvin Goldman’s “partial redeployment” account of meta-belief content. I then provide a process-reliabilist account of introspectively gained emotion-direction knowledge that outlines the minimum conditions of reliably forming emotion-direction beliefs, and specifies several ways in which the warrant of such beliefs could be defeated by relevant counterfactual alternatives. The overall account suggests how distinct introspective processes might be epistemically synergistic.     

The Social Virtues: Two Accounts

Social (epistemic) virtues are the virtues bound up with those forms of inquiry involved in social routes to knowledge. A thoroughly individualistic account of the social virtues endorses two claims: (1) we can fully characterize the nature of the social virtues independent of the social factors that are typically in play when these virtues are exemplified, and (2) even when a subject’s route to knowledge is social, the only epistemic virtues that are relevant to her acquisition of knowledge are those she herself possesses. A social (or anti-individualistic) account of the social virtues, by contrast, denies one or both of these claims. I will offer some reasons for thinking that the individualistic account is not acceptable, and that one or the other social account provides a better understanding of the social virtues. The argument is not decisive, but it does suggest that the social dimension of social epistemic virtues is not fully characterizable in individualistic terms.     

What Is Entitlement?

In his seminal paper, “Content Preservation,” Tyler Burge defends an original account of testimonial knowledge. The originality of the account is due, in part, to the fact that it is cast within a novel epistemic framework. The central feature of that framework is the introduction of the concept of entitlement, which is alleged to be a distinctive type of positive epistemic support or warrant. Entitlement and justification, according to Burge, are sub-species of warrant. Justification is the internalist form of warrant, but entitlement is epistemically externalist. My focus in this paper is Burge’s conception of entitlement, and there are three primary issues that I wish to address. What is the relationship between entitlement and the more traditional concept of justification? In what sense is entitlement epistemically externalist? Has Burge introduced a new epistemic concept or merely coined a new term for a familiar epistemic concept?     

The “DUEL” expert system: Implementation of a dual approach for IBM-compatible computers

We describe the “DUEL” expert system, a software package intended for analyzing problem situations and decision making in medical, economic, engineering, and other systems, based on modern information technology, the introduction of knowledge and data bases, and deductive and inductive approaches to the synthesis and justification of decisions. “DUEL” is two inference machines: a deductive machine that uses the products contained in the knowledge base, and an inductive machine that provides generalization on the basis of precedents accumulated in the data base. Translated fromDinamicheskie Sistemy, No. 13, 1994, pp. 93–98.     

Possible Worlds of Doubt

A prominent contemporary anti-skeptical strategy, most famously articulated by Keith DeRose, aims to cage the skeptic′s doubts by contextualizing subjunctive conditional accounts of knowledge through a conversational rule of sensitivity. This strategy, I argue, courts charges of circularity by selectively invoking heavy counterfactual machinery. The reason: such invocation threatens to utilize a metric for modal comparison that is implicitly informed by judgments of epistemic sameness. This gives us reason to fear that said modal metric is selectively cherry-picked in advance to support the very anti-skeptical conclusion for which the contextualist longs.     

Investors’ preference for a positive tax rate depends on the level of the interest rate

In a financial market with only one stock, Cadenillas and Pliska (Financ Stoch 3:137–165, 1999) showed that sometimes investors can take advantage of a positive tax rate to maximize their portfolio return. Buescu et al. (Math Finance 17:477–485, 2007) generalized this surprising result to a market with one stock and one bank account with zero interest rate. We consider instead a financial market with one stock and one bank account with positive interest rate. As in the papers above, we assume that there are taxes and transaction costs in the financial market. We succeed in solving the problem of an investor who wants to maximize the long-run growth rate of his investment, even though the positivity of the interest rate increases the dimensionality of the problem and the difficulty of the computations. We characterize how the investors’ preference for a positive tax rate depends on the interest rate level: investors prefer a positive tax rate when the level of the interest rate is low, and the opposite occurs when the level of the interest rate is high. Most of the contributions of C. Buescu were made during his doctoral studies at the University of Alberta. The research of C. Buescu and A. Cadenillas was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada grants 410-2003-1401 and 410-2006-1069. We are grateful to Stanley R. Pliska for comments and suggestions to a previous version of the paper, and to the associate editor and referees for constructive remarks. Existing errors are our sole responsibility.     

Product line optimization in the presence of preferences for compromise alternatives

Recent advances in customer choice analysis demonstrated the strong impact of compromise alternatives on the behaviour of decision-makers in a wide range of decision situations. Compromise alternatives are characterized by an intermediate performance on some of the relevant attributes. For instance, price compromises are well known in the sense that customers tend to buy neither the cheapest, nor the most expensive alternative, but the mid-priced one. However, thus far, the literature on product line optimization has not considered such context effects.In this paper, we propose a model-based approach for optimal product line selection which incorporates customers’ preferences for compromise alternatives. We consider customer choice in a realistic, sophisticated fashion by applying an established utility model that integrates compromise variables into a multinomial logit model. We formulate the resulting optimization problem as a mixed-integer linear program. The challenging feature for modelling – making the formulation substantially more complicated than existing ones without compromises – are the endogenous effects of selected products on other alternatives’ utilities that need to be adequately captured via compromise variables. Based on data we collected by a stated choice experiment in a retail setting, we perform a computational study and demonstrate the superiority of our product line selection approach compared to a reference model that does not take compromises into account. Even under uncertainty of the estimated utility parameters, profit gains of, on average, 23% can be achieved in our experimental setting.