Multiple-issue bargaining and axiomatic solutions

We study two-person, multiple-issue bargaining problems and identify four procedures by which the bargaining may take place. Drawing on some logic from non-cooperative game theory, we propose axioms which relate the outcomes of the procedures. We also promote a weak monotonicity axiom on solutions, called issue-by-issue monotonicity, which is geared toward multiple-issue bargaining. Our main result concerns the relationship between a sequential bargaining procedure — with the rule that agreements are implemented only after all issues are resolved — and global bargaining (in which all issues are negotiated simultaneously). If a bargaining solution predicts the same outcome with these two procedures, then we say that it satisfiesagenda independence. We prove that a solution satisfies axioms of efficiency, symmetry, scale invariance, issue-by-issue monotonicity, and agenda independence if and only if it is the Nash solution. This result provides new intuition for Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. Among other results, we show that a solution is invariant to all four of the procedures and satisfies efficiency and symmetry if and only if it is the utilitarian solution with equal weights. We comment on the results of other authors who address multiple-issue bargaining.     

Rationing with baselines: the composition extension operator

We introduce a new operator for general rationing problems in which, besides conflicting claims, individual baselines play an important role in the rationing process. The operator builds onto ideas of composition, which are not only frequent in rationing, but also in related problems such as bargaining, choice, and queuing. We characterize the operator and show how it preserves some standard axioms in the literature on rationing. We also relate it to recent contributions in such literature.     

Independence of irrelevant expansions

Nash characterized the only bargaining solution to satisfy a well-known list of axioms. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives states invariance of the solution outcome under certain contractions of the bargaining problem. A dual of this axiom is proposed here, stating invariance under certainexpansions of the bargaining problem andNash's solution is characerized by substituting this axiom for IIA in Nash's original list. After a transposition from the domain of bargaining solutions to the domain of choice rules, and a weakening of Invariance with respect to Positive Affine Transformations toTranslation Invariance, this new list of axioms is shown to characterizeUtilitarian rules.     

Group preference aggregation in the multiplicative AHP The model of the group decision process and Pareto optimality

A recent paper has focused awareness on group aggregation procedures in the AHP, showing that geometric mean aggregation violates the desirable social choice axiom of Pareto optimality. We show that this violation can be attributed to the representation used to model the group decision process, thereby questioning the legitimacy of the Pareto optimality axiom. We furthermore propose a geometric mean group aggregation procedure which satisfies all the social choice axioms suggested.     

Making choices with a binary relation: Relative choice axioms and transitive closures

This article presents an axiomatic analysis of the best choice decision problem from a reflexive crisp binary relation on a finite set (a digraph). With respect to a transitive digraph, optimality and maximality are usually accepted as the best fitted choice axioms to the intuitive notion of best choice. However, beyond transitivity (resp. acyclicity), optimality and maximality can characterise distinct choice sets (resp. empty sets). Accordingly, different and rather unsatisfying concepts have appeared, such as von Neumann–Morgenstern domination, weak transitive closure and kernels. Here, we investigate a new family of eight choice axioms for digraphs: relative choice axioms. Within choice theory, these axioms generalise top-cycle for tournaments, gocha, getcha and rational top-cycle for complete digraphs. We present their main properties such as existence, uniqueness, idempotence, internal structure, and cross comparison. We then show their strong relationship with optimality and maximality when the latter are not empty. Otherwise, these axioms identify a non-empty choice set and underline conflicts between chosen elements in strict preference circuits. Finally, we exploit the close link between this family and transitive closures to compute choice sets in linear time, followed by a relevant practical application.     

A procedure for selection of a multiobjective technique with application to water and mineral resources

The problem of selecting the appropriate multiobjective solution technique to solve an arbitrary multiobjective decision problem is considered. Various classification schemes of available techniques are discussed, leading to the development of a set of 28 model choice criteria and an algorithm for model choice. This algorithm divides the criteria into four groups, only one of which must be reevaluated for each decision problem encountered. The model choice problem is itself modeled as a multiobjective decision problem—strongly influenced, however, by the individual performing the analysis. The appropriate technique is selected for implementation by use of the compromise programming technique. Two example problems are presented to demonstrate the use of this algorithm. The first is concerned with ranking a predefined set of river basin planning alternatives with multiple noncommensurate ordinally ranked consequences. The second deals with coal blending and is modeled by dual objective linear programming. An appropriate multiobjective solution technique is selected for each of these two examples.     

A new decision support model in multi-criteria decision making with intuitionistic fuzzy sets based on risk preferences and criteria reduction

In this paper, we propose a new model for decision support to address the ‘large decision table’ (eg, many criteria) challenge in intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IFSs) multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) problems. This new model involves risk preferences of decision makers (DMs) based on the prospect theory and criteria reduction. First, we build three relationship models based on different types of DMs’ risk preferences. By building different discernibility matrices according to relationship models, we find useful criteria for IFS MCDM problems. Second, we propose a technique to obtain weights through discernibility matrix. Third, we also propose a new method to rank and select the most desirable choice(s) according to weighted combinatorial advantage values of alternatives. Finally, we use a realistic voting example to demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed method and construct a new decision support model for IFS MCDM problems.     

Envy-free rights assignments and self-oriented preferences

Very recently a new solution to Sen's “Impossibility of a Paretian liberal” has been suggested where the focus is on the rights assignments per se (Austen-Smith, 1979). It was shown that the concept of fairness, when applied to rights, admits the existence of social decision functions which satisfy Sen's original conditions. Unfortunately this result collapses when individuals have rights over more than one pair of alternatives.In order to obtain possibility results for this more general case the present paper proposes to restrict individuals' preference orderings. It is proved that envy-free collective choice rules exist if individual preferences are self-oriented and if, in addition, people attach primary importance to their own private sphere alternatives. These restrictions are quite severe, but they may be justified if one values the absence of envy in rights allocations very highly.     

随机偏爱群体决策的随机Borda数法

对于具随机偏爱信息的群体决策问题，本文引入供选方案的随机Borda数和供选方案集上的随机Borda数映射概念．在讨论了随机Borda数映射满足随机偏爱公理的基础上，给出一个对所有供选方案进行群体排序的方法．     

Modeling subjective evaluation for fuzzy group multicriteria decision making

This paper presents a new fuzzy multicriteria decision making (MCDM) approach for evaluating decision alternatives involving subjective judgements made by a group of decision makers. A pairwise comparison process is used to help individual decision makers make comparative judgements, and a linguistic rating method is used for making absolute judgements. A hierarchical weighting method is developed to assess the weights of a large number of evaluation criteria by pairwise comparisons. To reflect the inherent imprecision of subjective judgements, individual assessments are aggregated as a group assessment using triangular fuzzy numbers. To obtain a cardinal preference value for each decision alternative, a new fuzzy MCDM algorithm is developed by extending the concept of the degree of optimality to incorporate criteria weights in the distance measurement. An empirical study of aircraft selection is presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the approach.     

Models of social contagion

This paper argues that social choice from among more than two feasible alternatives should not be based on social choice from two‐alternative subsets. It considers in some detail the case where one alternative ties or beats every other alternative on the basis of simple majorities, and raises the question of whether such an alternative should be chosen. A condition of ‘stochastic unanimity’, introduced in this context, is shown to be incompatible with the simple majority rule when it can apply. This new condition plus a consideration of ties leads into a brief discussion of the use of individual expected utility in social choice theory.     

A DSS for multiple criteria decision analysis with imprecisely specified trade-offs

The paper describes a decision support system (DSS) for multiple criteria decision analysis (MCDA). It is assumed that the information about the trade-offs is given in the form of lower and upper bounds. The software helps the user to identify candidate solutions from a finite set of decision alternatives and can be used in an interactive decision process. The choice of the software features is based on the author's experience with an environmental case study, which is discussed.     

带有乘积型多目标权函数的调度谈判问题

在供应链环境下的生产活动中,各成员对所辖资源具有独立的支配权,因此需要合理的机制使得协同调度方案得以实施,以提高供应链整体的效率.研究由具备不同讨价还价能力的成员所组成的供应链,建立了以纳什讨价还价公理体系为基础的调度谈判模型.在装配系统中,讨论两供应商关于交付顺序的协商.为求取纳什谈判解,提出了一类新的以多目标乘积项作为目标函数的调度问题.对于单机型供应商,新问题的计算复杂性尚未确定,设计了一种多项式时间的启发式算法以求得近优解,并通过数值算例进行验证.该谈判模型为供应链中各成员提供了一种合理的调度协调机制.     

A prominence theory of context‐sensitive choice behavior

A simple theory of context‐sensitive choice behavior is proposed which focuses on the role of perceived prominence among alternatives. The fundamental hypothesis is that the similarity (or lack of similarity) among alternatives determines their relative prominence, and that, other things being equal, more prominent alternatives have a better chance of being chosen. This prominence theory of choice is formalized in terms of two testable axioms, which are shown to characterize a wide class of prominence choice models. In addition, a number of refinements and extensions of the basic theory are explored which incorporate a richer variety of perceived‐prominence behavior.     

Approach to group decision making based on determining the weights of experts by using projection method

The aim of this paper is to present a new approach for determining weights of experts in the group decision making problems. Group decision making has become a very active research field over the last decade. Especially, the investigation to determine weights of experts for group decision making has attracted great interests from researchers recently and some approaches have been developed. In this paper, the weights of experts are determined in the group decision environment via projection method. First of all, the average decision of all individual decisions is defined as the ideal decision. After that, the weight of expert is determined by the projection of individual decision on the ideal decision. By using the weights of experts, all individual decisions are aggregate into a collective decision. Then an ideal solution of alternatives of the collective decision, expressed by a vector, is determined. Further, the preference order of alternatives are ranked in accordance with the projections of alternatives on the ideal solution. Comparisons with an extended TOPSIS method are also made. Finally, an example is provided to illustrate the developed approach.     

Restricted domains,arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and non-manipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives

An n-person social choice problem is considered in which the alternatives are n dimensional vectors, with the ith component of such a vector being the part of the alternatives affecting individual i alone. Assuming that individuals are selfish (individual i must be indifferent between any two alternatives with the same components), that they may be indifferent among alternatives and that each individual may choose his preferences out of a different set of permissible preferences, we prove that any set of restricted domains of preferences admits an n person non-dictatorial Arrow-type social welfare function if and only if it admits a two-person Arrow-type social welfare function: we characterize all the sets of restricted domains of preferences which admit two-person Arrow-type social welfare functions (and therefore also admit n-person Arrow-type social welfare functions) and then we prove that we also characterized all the sets of restricted domains of preferences which admit nondictatorial, nonmanipulable, noncorruptible and rational social choice correspondences.     

Rank reversals in multi-criteria decision analysis with statistical modelling of ratio-scale pairwise comparisons

In multi-criteria decision analysis, the overall performance of decision alternatives is evaluated with respect to several, generally conflicting decision criteria. One approach to perform the multi-criteria decision analysis is to use ratio-scale pairwise comparisons concerning the performance of decision alternatives and the importance of decision criteria. In this approach, a classical problem has been the phenomenon of rank reversals. In particular, when a new decision alternative is added to a decision problem, and while the assessments concerning the original decision alternatives remain unchanged, the new alternative may cause rank reversals between the utility estimates of the original decision alternatives. This paper studies the connections between rank reversals and the potential inconsistency of the utility assessments in the case of ratio-scale pairwise comparisons data. The analysis was carried out by recently developed statistical modelling techniques so that the inconsistency of the assessments was measured according to statistical estimation theory. Several type of decision problems were analysed and the results showed that rank reversals caused by inconsistency are natural and acceptable. On the other hand, rank reversals caused by the traditional arithmetic-mean aggregation rule are not in line with the ratio-scale measurement of utilities, whereas geometric-mean aggregation does not cause undesired rank reversals.     

Influence of aggregation and measurement scale on ranking a compromise alternative in AHP

Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is one of the most popular multi-attribute decision aid methods. However, within AHP, there are several competing preference measurement scales and aggregation techniques. In this paper, we compare these possibilities using a decision problem with an inherent trade-off between two criteria. A decision-maker has to choose among three alternatives: two extremes and one compromise. Six different measurement scales described previously in the literature and the new proposed logarithmic scale are considered for applying the additive and the multiplicative aggregation techniques. The results are compared with the standard consumer choice theory. We find that with the geometric and power scales a compromise is never selected when aggregation is additive and rarely when aggregation is multiplicative, while the logarithmic scale used with the multiplicative aggregation most often selects the compromise that is desirable by consumer choice theory.