The semantics of knowledge attributions

The basic idea of conversational contextualism is that knowledge attributions are context sensitive in that a given knowledge attribution may be true if made in one context but false if made in another, owing to differences in the attributors’ conversational contexts. Moreover, the context sensitivity involved is traced back to the context sensitivity of the word “know,” which, in turn, is commonly modelled on the case either of genuine indexicals such as “I” or “here” or of comparative adjectives such as “tall” or “rich.” But contextualism faces various problems. I argue that in order to solve these problems we need to look for another account of the context sensitivity involved in knowledge attributions and I sketch an alternative proposal.     

Contextualism on a pragmatic,not a skeptical,footing

Contextualism is supposed to explain why the following argument for skepticism seems plausible: (1) I don’t know that I am not a bodiless brain-in-a-vat (BIV); (2) If I know I have hands, then I know I am not a bodiless BIV; (3) Therefore, I do not know I have hands. Keith DeRose claims that (1) and (2) are “initially plausible.” I claim that (1) is initially plausible only because of an implicit argument that stands behind it; it is not intuitively plausible. The argument DeRose offers is based on the requirement of sensitivity, that is, on the idea that if you know something then you would not believe it if it were false. I criticize the sensitivity requirement thereby undercutting its support for (1) and the skeptical data that contextualism is meant to explain. While skepticism is not a plausible ground for contextualism, I argue that certain pragmatic considerations are. It’s plausible to think that to know something more evidence is required when more is at stake. The best way to handle skepticism is to criticize the arguments for it. We should not adopt contextualism as a means of accommodating skepticism even if there are other pragmatic reasons for being a contextualist about knowledge.     

What Mary’s Aboutness Is About

The aim of this paper is to reinforce anti-physicalism by extending the “hard problem” to a specific kind of intentional states. For reaching this target, I investigate the mental content of the new intentional states of Jackson’s Mary. I proceed in the following way: I start analyzing the knowledge argument, which highlights the “hard problem” tied to phenomenal consciousness. In a second step, I investigate a powerful physicalist reply to this argument: the phenomenal concept strategy. In a third step, I propose a constitutional account of phenomenal concepts that captures the Mary scenario adequately, but implies anti-physicalist referents. In a last step, I point at the ramifications constitutional phenomenal concepts have on the constitution of Mary’s new intentional states. Therefore, by focusing the attention on phenomenal concepts, the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness will be carried over to the alleged “easy problem” of intentional states as well.     

Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism

Conversational contextualism in epistemology is characterized by four main theses: 1. the indexicality of knowledge claims thesis; 2. the attributor contextualism thesis; 3. the conversational contextualism thesis, and 4. the main thesis of contextualism according to which a knowledge claim can be true in one context and false in another context in which more stringent standards for knowledge are operant. It is argued that these theses taken together generate problems for contextualism. In particular, it is shown that there is no context in which the contextualist can truthfully claim to know her theory is true. Since these results were obtained only with principles the contextualist cannot give up—like the principle of epistemic closure and the principle that knowledge implies truth—it seems that contextualism is in need of a thoroughgoing revision if it is to become a successful epistemic theory.     

Scepticism,context and modal reasoning

I analyze some classical solutions of the skeptical argument and some of their week points (especially the contextualist solution). First I have proposed some possible improvement of the contextualist solution (the introduction of the explicit-implicit belief and knowledge distinction beside the differences in the relevance of some counter-factual alternatives). However, this solution does not block too fast jumps of the everyday context (where empirical knowledge is possible) into skeptical context (where empirical knowledge is impossible). Then I analyze some formal analogies between some modal arguments on the contingency of empirical facts (and the world as whole) and the skeptical arguments against empirical knowledge. I try to show that the skeptical conclusion “Empirical knowledge does not exist” is logically coherent with the thesis that they are empirical facts and that we have true belief on them. In order to do that without contradictions I have to accept a non-classical definition of knowledge: S knows that p:= S is not justified to allow that non-p. Knowledge and justified allowance function here as some pseudo-theoretical concepts which allow only some partial and conditional definitions by some “empirical” terms and logical conditions.     

Coherentism,Truth, and Witness Agreement

Coherentists on epistemic justification claim that all justification is inferential, and that beliefs, when justified, get their justification together (not in isolation) as members of a coherent belief system. Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “individual credibility” is needed for “witness agreement” to increase the probability of truth and generate a high probability of truth. It can seem that, from this result in formal epistemology, it follows that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive, that it is not the case that, under the requisite conditions, coherentist justification increases the probability of truth and generates a high probability of truth. I argue that this does not follow.     

The slingshot argument and the correspondence theory of truth

The correspondence theory of truth holds that each true sentence corresponds to a discrete fact. Donald Davidson and others have argued (using an argument that has come to be known as the slingshot) that this theory is mistaken, since all true sentences correspond to the same “Great Fact.” The argument is designed to show that by substituting logically equivalent sentences and coreferring terms for each other in the context of sentences of the form ‘P corresponds to the fact that P’ every true sentence can be shown to correspond to the same facts as every other true sentence. The claim is that all substitution of logically equivalent sentences and coreferring terms takes place salva veritate. I argue that the substitution of coreferring terms in this context need not preserve truth. The slingshot fails to refute the correspondence theory.     

Expressing and Describing Experiences. A Case of Showing Versus Saying

Experiences are interpreted as conscious mental occurrences that are of phenomenal character. There is already a kind of (weak) intentionality involved with this phenomenal interpretation. A stricter conception of experiences distinguishes between purely phenomenal experiences and intentional experiences in a narrow sense. Wittgenstein’s account of psychological (experiential) verbs is taken over: Usually, expressing mental states verbally is not describing them. According to this, “I believe” can be seen as an expression of one’s own belief, but not as an expression of a belief about one’s belief. Hence, the utterance “I believe it is raining” shows that I believe that it is raining, although it is not said by these words that I believe that it is raining. Thinking thoughts such as “I believe it is raining, but it is not raining” (a variant of Moore’s paradox) is an absurdity between what is already said by silently uttering “It is not raining” and what is shown by silently uttering “I believe it is raining.” The paper agrees with a main result of Wittgenstein’s considerations of Moore’s paradox, namely the view that logical structure, deducibility, and consistency cannot be reduced solely to propositions—besides a logic of propositions, there is, for example, a logic of assertions and of imperatives, respectively.     

The Pepsi Putnam Challenge

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Cohn Adam’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be hannless.     

The sweet mystery of compatibilism

Any satisfactory account of freedom must capture, or at least permit, the mysteriousness of freedom—a “sweet” mystery involving a certain kind of ignorance rather than a “sour” mystery of unintelligibility, incoherence, or unjustifiedness. I argue that compatibilism can capture the sweet mystery of freedom. I argue first that an action is free if and only if a certain “rationality constraint” is satisfied, and that nothing in standard libertarian accounts of freedom entails its satisfaction. Satisfaction of this constraint is consistent with the universal causal predetermination of action (UCP). If UCP is true and the rationality constraint satisfied, there’s a sense in which our actions are explanatorily (though not necessarily causally) overdetermined. While it seems plausible (given UCP) that our actions are so overdetermined, it seems utterly mysterious why they should be so overdetermined. Compatibilism’s capacity to accommodate this mystery is a mark in its favor.     

The physical inconsistency of the Schwarzschild and Kerr solutions

The metric of a neutral stationary “black hole” does not satisfy the causality conditions formulated by Hilbert. As a consequence, a trial body falling freely, for instance, into a rotating “black hole” develops a speed equal to the speed of light on the ergosphere shell during a finite time in the reference frame of a distant observer, which results in physical inconsistency and indicates the principal drawback of the vacuum solution of Einstein’s equation outside a source.     

On trees covering chains or stars

In this paper, in the context of the “dessins d’enfants” theory, we give a combinatorial criterion for a plane tree to cover a tree from the classes of “chains” or “stars.” We also discuss some applications of this result that are related to the arithmetical theory of torsion on curves. Translated from Fundamentalnaya i Prikladnaya Matematika, Vol. 13, No. 6, pp. 207–215, 2007.     

Vagueness, ignorance, and margins for error

We argue that the epistemic theory of vagueness cannot adequately justify its key tenet-that vague predicates have precisely bounded extensions, of which we are necessarily ignorant. Nor can the theory adequately account for our ignorance of the truth values of borderline cases. Furthermore, we argue that Williamson’s promising attempt to explicate our understanding of vague language on the model of a certain sort of “inexact knowledge” is at best incomplete, since certain forms of vagueness do not fit Williamson’s model, and in fact fit an alternative model. Finally, we point out that a certain kind of irremediable inexactitude postulated by physics need not be-and is not commonly-interpreted as epistemic. Thus, there are aspects of contemporary science that do not accord well with the epistemicist outlook.     

Future teachers’ general pedagogical knowledge from a comparative perspective: does school experience matter?

General pedagogical knowledge (GPK) is a central component of teacher knowledge. Teacher education programs in many countries therefore provide corresponding opportunities to learn (OTL), and in-school experience is regarded as a core component of OTL fostering knowledge in the area of general pedagogy. However, empirical research on the effectiveness of school experiences during teacher education does not tell us precisely how different kinds of OTL are related to GPK. This paper first reports on the conceptualizing of the GPK test in the context of TEDS-M. Then the relationship between practical in-school OTL of German and US future primary teachers and their GPK is investigated. On the basis of results from Latent-Class Analysis using two core indicators of in-school OTL (the length of time spent on teaching students and the extent of being supported by a mentor or supervisor), three types of future primary teachers in both the US and Germany are distinguished: “starting” (type 1), “autonomous” (type 2), and “balanced” (type 3). In both countries, type 3 future primary teachers reported that they had had OTL to reflect on and improve their teaching to a larger extent than the type 1 teachers. Type 3 teachers also generally achieved better GPK test results than type 1 teachers. Furthermore, there is also a tendency that type 3 future teachers show better results than type 2. Based on these results, we hypothesize that the quality of future teachers’ activities during in-school practicum matters with regard to important outcomes of teacher education, making in-school OTL an effective component of teacher education. Research findings are discussed with regard to the relationship between theory and practice during teacher education.     

Copulas: Tales and facts

“But he does not wear any clothes” said the little child in Hans Christian Andersen’s “The Emperor’s New Clothes.”Mikosch’s research is partially supported by the Danish Research Council (SNF) GrantNo 21-04-0400. This is a discussion paper which was initiated at the 4th InternationalConference on Extreme Value Analysis in Gothenburg, 15–19 August, 2005; see.     

Perception and Virtue Reliabilism

In some recent work, Ernest Sosa rejects the “perceptual model” of rational intuition, according to which intuitive beliefs (e.g., that 2 + 2 = 4 2 + 2 = 4 ) are justified by standing in the appropriate relation to a nondoxastic intellectual experience (a seeming-true, or the like), in much the way that perceptual beliefs are often held to be justified by an appropriate relation to nondoxastic sense experiential states. By extending some of Sosa’s arguments and adding a few of my own, I argue that Sosa is right to reject the perceptual model of intuition, and that we should reject the “perceptual model” of perception as well. Rational intuition and perception should both receive a virtue theoretic (e.g., reliabilist) account, rather than an evidentialist one. To this end, I explicitly argue against the Grounds Principle, which holds that all justified beliefs must be based on some adequate reason, or ground.     

Righting the early history of computing,or how sausage was made

The short answer to the question just posed seems to be, “Not much.” Since I have given “the long answer” elsewhere,¹² I can summarize it here. Berg could see no point in writing Bromley. What could he write to someone he believed guilty of plagiarism? What could such a letter accomplish? He did, however, write to New York University Press; to all the universities involved, and to the Works’ English publisher (Pickering and Chatto), who said they passed the letter on to Campbell-Kelly (30 June 1990); to a great many professional societies in Australia, England, and the United States; to a great many governmental agencies and some politicians in those countries; to some publications, both academic and popular; to the Pope and several cardinals; and to a miscellany of other individuals. Generally, those in the best position to do something—for example, the three universities involved —did not even answer Berg’s letter. Others often did answer, but their answer was generally that they were in no position to do anything. That was how matters stood when I published my first article on “the Berg Affair”.₁₂ Its publication finally roused those best positioned to answer. Late in 1993, Galler, Bromley, and Campbell-Kelly wrote letters to the editor of Accountability in Research criticizing me for not getting their side of the story before I published Berg’s. Campbell-Kelly threatened the journal’s publisher with a lawsuit if I (or it) did not retract. The three also provided some insight into what their explanation of events might be. Bromley, though listed prominently in ads for the Works, claimed to have had only a small part, merely advising Campbell-Kelly on selection and arrangement of the papers printed in Volumes 2 and 3. Campbell-Kelly confirmed that Bromley took no part in the detailed editing or in the provision of documents. That work was performed by one C.J.D. (“Jim”) Roberts, a “London-based independent scholar” who was “editorial consultant to the Works” (and, apparently, worked directly under Campbell-Kelly). Roberts seems to deserve more public credit than he has so far received. According to Campbell-Kelly, it was Roberts who, making a systematic search for unknown holdings of Babbage, turned up the original of the letter to Quetelet by writing the Royal Library (one “tiny triumph” among many). Campbell-Kelly also claimed that neither he nor Roberts knew of Berg’s prior discovery.     

Generalizing the Disappearing Act: A Reply to István Aranyosi

In “The Reappearing Act” István Aranyosi postulates a new way of seeing to solve a puzzle posed in “The Disappearing Act;” an object that is exactly shaded can be seen simply by virtue of its contrast with its environment – just like a shadow. This object need not reflect, refract, absorb or block light. To undermine the motive for this heretical innovation, I generalize the puzzle to situations involving inexact shading. Aranyosi cannot extend his solution to these variations because he needs to conserve principles of camouflage. On the bright side, the solution to the puzzle that I propose in my book Seeing Dark Things does extend to these variations.