Mind Stuffed with Red Herrings: Why William James’ Critique of the Mind-Stuff Theory Does not Substantiate a Combination Problem for Panpsychism

There is a famous passage in chapter six of James’ Principles of Psychology whose import, many believe, deals a devastating blow to the explanatory aspirations of panpsychism. In the present paper I take a close look at James’ argument, as well as at the claim that it underlies a powerful critique of panpsychism. Apart from the fact that the argument was never aimed at panpsychism as such, I show that it rests on highly problematic assumptions which, if followed to their logical consequences, are just as inedible to contemporary critics of panpsychism as they are to its present-day supporters. Hence, a naïve employment of the argument, as a critique leveled by physicalists against panpsychism, is counterproductive and even self-defeating. After examining the metaphysical shortcomings undermining James’ position (as well as the hasty “refutations” of panpsychism based on it), I conclude with some reflections on what needs to be done in order to obtain a better perspective regarding the explanatory prospects of panpsychism as an alternative approach to mainstream physicalism in the study of conscious phenomena.     

Causal emergentism

In this paper I describe basic features of traditional (British) emergentism and Popper’s emergentist theory of consciousness and compare them to the contemporary versions of emergentism present in connectionist approach in cognitive sciences. I argue that despite their similarities, the traditional form, as well as Popper’s theory belong to strong causal emergentism and yield radically different ontological consequences compared to the weaker, contemporary version present in cognitive science. Strong causal emergentism denies the causal closure of the physical domain and introduces genuine new mental causal powers and genuine downward causation, while weak emergentism provides new insights in understanding the mechanisms and explanation that is compatible with physicalism.     

Content essentialism

The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat against this, I then point out that a “sexy” conclusion that is sometimes drawn from Putnam-Burge-style externalist arguments, namely that our mental states are not in our heads, presupposes content essentialism — which suggests that the view is not entirely trivial. Moreover, it seems intuitively that physicalists should reject the view: If beliefs are physical states, how could they have their propositional contents essentially? I distinguish three readings of the title question. Content essentialism does seem fairly obvious on the first two, but not so on the third. I argue that the common-sense argument mentioned earlier presupposes one of the first two readings but fails to apply to the third, on which ‘belief’ refers to belief-state tokens. That’s because ordinary belief individuation is silent about belief-state tokens. Token physicalists, I suggest, should indeed reject content essentialism about belief-state tokens. What about token dualists? One might think they ought to embrace content essentialism about belief-state tokens. I end with puzzling why this should be so.     

Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered

One controversial position in the debate over dispositional and categorical properties maintains that our concepts of these properties are the result of partially considering unitary properties that are both dispositional and categorical. As one of its defenders (Heil 2005, p. 351) admits, this position is typically met with “incredulous stares”. In this paper, I examine whether such a reaction is warranted. This thesis about properties is an instance of what I call “the Partial Consideration Strategy”—i.e., the strategy of claiming that what were formerly thought of as distinct entities are actually a unified entity, partially considered. By evaluating its use in other debates, I uncover a multi-layered prima facie case against the use of the Partial Consideration Strategy in the dispositional/categorical properties debate. In closing, I describe how the Partial Consideration Strategy can be reworked in a way that would allow it to sidestep this prima facie case.     

A model of concept formation

At first we model the way an intelligence “I” constructs statements from phrases, and then how “I” interlocks these statements to form a string of statements to attain a concept. These strings of statements are called progressions. That is, starting with an initial stimulating relation between two phrases, we study how “I” forms the first statement of the progression and continues from this first statement to form the remaining statements in these progressions to construct a concept. We assume that “I” retains the progressions that it has constructed. Then we show how these retained progressions provide “I” with a platform to incrementally constructs more and more sophisticated conceptual structures. The reason for the construction of these conceptual structures is to achieve additional concepts. Choice plays a very important role in the progression and concept formation. We show that as “I” forms new concepts, it enriches its conceptual structure and makes further concepts attainable. This incremental attainment of concepts is a way in which we humans learn, and this paper studies the attainability of concepts from previously attained concepts. We also study the ability of “I” to apply its progressions and also the ability of “I” to electively manipulate its conceptual structure to achieve new concepts. Application and elective manipulation requires of “I” ingenuity and insight. We also show that as “I” attains new concepts, the conceptual structures change and circumstances arise where unanticipated conceptual discoveries are attainable. As the conceptual structure of “I” is developed, the logical and structural relationships between concepts embedded in this structure also develop. These relationships help “I” understand concepts in the context of other concepts and help “I₁” communicate to another “I₂” information and concept structures. The conceptual structures formed by “I” give rise to a directed web of statement paths which is called a convolution web. The convolution web provides “I” with the paths along which it can reason and obtain new concepts and alternative ways to attain a given concept.This paper is an extension of the ideas introduced in [1]. It is written to be self-contained and the required background is supplied as needed.     

Basic concepts for a theory of evaluation: The aggregative operator

Starting with an explication of the “aggregative”-concept and deducing a general structure which satisfies a number of minimal requirements (properties of clustering) the main features of a new mathematical theory — called “theory of evaluation” — are developed. The theory sheds new light on such well-known concepts as membership, conjunction and disjunction and seems to be a very promising tool to handle representation problems as they grow from the fields of theory of fuzzy set, and its many applications, of human decision making and of multicriteria analysis.     

Positional strengthenings of the maximum principle and sufficient optimality conditions

We derive nonlocal necessary optimality conditions, which efficiently strengthen the classical Pontryagin maximum principle and its modification obtained by B. Ka?kosz and S. ?ojasiewicz as well as our previous result of a similar kind named the “feedback minimum principle.” The strengthening of the feedback minimum principle (and, hence, of the Pontryagin principle) is owing to the employment of two types of feedback controls “compatible” with a reference trajectory (i.e., producing this trajectory as a Carath´eodory solution). In each of the versions, the strengthened feedback minimum principle states that the optimality of a reference process implies the optimality of its trajectory in a certain family of variational problems generated by cotrajectories of the original and compatible controls. The basic construction of the feedback minimum principle—a perturbation of a solution to the adjoint system—is employed to prove an exact formula for the increment of the cost functional. We use this formula to obtain sufficient conditions for the strong and global minimum of Pontryagin’s extremals. These conditions are much milder than their known analogs, which require the convexity in the state variable of the functional and of the lower Hamiltonian. Our study is focused on a nonlinear smooth Mayer problem with free terminal states. All assertions are illustrated by examples.     

A note on the “principle of material frame-indifference in the limit of two-dimensional turbulence”

In this note we show that the setting up of the “principle of material frame-indifference in the limit of two-dimensional turbulence” by Speziale in the 1980s, which has been applied to turbulence modelling for the past two decades as seen from the literature, is unsound—in fact, there is an inconsistency in dealing with the fluctuating pressure which leads to contradicting the physical facts of turbulence. We conclude that this so-called “principle of material frame-indifference in the limit of two-dimensional turbulence” for turbulence modelling should be discarded.     

Functional Reduction and Mental Causation

Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism about mental properties or leads to a view that is similar to one of the versions of non-reductive physicalism that he criticizes. We will show that depending on how certain key claims are interpreted, there are reasons for thinking functional reduction has these implications, in which case either Kim fails to provide a robust account of mental causation or there is reason to suspect that some of his criticisms of non-reductive physicalism are misguided.     

A comprehensive theory of representation for mathematics education

Representation is a difficult concept. Behaviorists wanted to get rid of it; many researchers prefer other terms like “conception” or “reasoning” or even “encoding;” and many cognitive science resarchers have tried to avoid the problem by reducing thinking to production rules.There are at least two simple and naive reasons for considering representation as an important subject for scientific study. The first one is that we all experience representation as a stream of internal images, gestures and words. The second one is that the words and symbols we use to communicate do not refer directly to reality but to represented entities: objects, properties, relationships, processes, actions, and constructs, about which there is no automatic agreement between two persons. It is the purpose of this paper to analyse this problem, and to try to connect it with an original analysis of the role of action in representation. The issue is important for mathematics education and even for the epistemology of mathematics, as mathematical concepts have their first roots in the action on, and in the representation of, the physical and social world; even though there may be a great distance today between that pragmatical and empirical source, and the sophisticated concepts of contemporary mathematics.     

Program explanations and causal relevance

Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose, viz., defends non-reductive physicalism against Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument according to which non-reductive physicalism is committed to epiphenomenalism because irreducible mental properties are ‘screened off’ from causal relevance by their physical realizers. Jackson and Pettit’s most promising explication of a program explanation appeals to the idea of invariance of effect under variation of realization, but I show that invariance of effect under variation of realization is neither necessary nor sufficient for causal relevance.     

“Value” of additional information in multicriterion analysis under uncertainty

The expected value of information in classical (monocriterion) decision analysis has been well covered in the literature. One cannot say the same thing about the multicriterion analysis, particularly when one is in the presence of multicriterion aggregation procedures based on outranking relations for a ranking problematic. The objective of this paper is to try to extend the Bayesian approach to a multicriterion analysis in the context of uncertainty. After illustrating the a posteriori analysis, we shall mention some difficulties associated with the pre a posteriori analysis and the concepts of the “expected value” of perfect or imperfect information.     

Universals: Ways or Things?

What all contemporary so-called aristotelian realists have in common has been identified by David Armstrong as the principle of instantiation. This principle has been put forward in different versions, but all of them have the following simple consequence in common: uninstantiated universals do not exist. Such entities are for the lotus-eating Platonist to countenance, but not for any sort of “moderate” realist. I shall argue that this principle, in any guise, is not the best way to differentiate aristotelianism from Platonism. In its place, I shall suggest that the best way to differentiate the two versions of realism from each other is by means of a far more powerful idea: naturalism. And the surprising conclusion given this means of differentiation will be that contrary to the usual proclamations, Platonism will be the more naturalistic theory, whereas aristotelianism will come to be seen for what it really is, namely, non-naturalistic.     

What Mary’s Aboutness Is About

The aim of this paper is to reinforce anti-physicalism by extending the “hard problem” to a specific kind of intentional states. For reaching this target, I investigate the mental content of the new intentional states of Jackson’s Mary. I proceed in the following way: I start analyzing the knowledge argument, which highlights the “hard problem” tied to phenomenal consciousness. In a second step, I investigate a powerful physicalist reply to this argument: the phenomenal concept strategy. In a third step, I propose a constitutional account of phenomenal concepts that captures the Mary scenario adequately, but implies anti-physicalist referents. In a last step, I point at the ramifications constitutional phenomenal concepts have on the constitution of Mary’s new intentional states. Therefore, by focusing the attention on phenomenal concepts, the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness will be carried over to the alleged “easy problem” of intentional states as well.     

On Knowing How I Feel About That—A Process-Reliabilist Approach

Human subjects seem to have a type of introspective access to their mental states that allows them to immediately judge the types and intensities of their occurrent emotions, as well as what those emotions are about or “directed at”. Such judgments manifest what I call “emotion-direction beliefs”, which, if reliably produced, may constitute emotion-direction knowledge. Many psychologists have argued that the “directed emotions” such beliefs represent have a componential structure, one that includes feelings of emotional responses and related but independent representations of what those feelings are about. I argue that such componentiality may help to explain how emotion-direction knowledge is achievable. I begin by developing a hybrid view of introspection that combines David Chalmers’ phenomenal realism with Alvin Goldman’s “partial redeployment” account of meta-belief content. I then provide a process-reliabilist account of introspectively gained emotion-direction knowledge that outlines the minimum conditions of reliably forming emotion-direction beliefs, and specifies several ways in which the warrant of such beliefs could be defeated by relevant counterfactual alternatives. The overall account suggests how distinct introspective processes might be epistemically synergistic.     

Early Abortion and Personal Ontology

We are beings endowed with “personal capacities”—the capacity for reason, for a concept of self, perhaps more. Among ontologically salient views about what else we are, I focus on the “Big Three.” According to animalism, we are animals that have psychological properties only contingently. According to psychologistic materialism, we are material beings; according to substance dualism, we are either immaterial beings or composites of immaterial and material ones; but according to both psychologistic materialism and substance dualism, we essentially have some psychological properties. I argue that—contrary to what has been argued and is natural to think—none of the Big Three yields different assignments of moral status to early fetuses from any of the others, and consequently the moral status of early abortion doesn’t depend on which (if any) of these views of personal ontology is correct.     

Contextualism,art, and rigidity: Levinson,Currie and Davies

The topic of this paper is the role played by context in art. In this regard I examine three theories linked to the names of J. Levinson, G. Currie and D. Davies. Levinson’s arguments undermine the structural theory. He finds it objectionable because it makes the individuation of artworks independent of their histories. Secondly, such a consequence is unacceptable because it fails to recognise that works are created rather than discovered. But, if certain general features of provenance are always work-constitutive, as it seems that Levinson is willing to claim, these features must always be essential properties of works. On the other hand, consideration of our modal practice suggests that whether a given general feature of provenance is essential or non-essential depends upon the particular work in question or is “work relative”. D. Davies builds his performance theory on the basis of the critical evaluation of Currie’s action-type hypotheses (ATH). Performances, says Davies, are not to be identified with “basic actions” to which their times belong essentially, but with “doings” that permit of the sorts of variation in modal properties required by the work-relativity of modality. He is also a fierce critic of the contextualist account. Contextualism is in his view unable to reflect the fact that aspects of provenance bear upon our modal judgements with variable force.In the second part of the paper I consider Davies’s “modality principle”. Davies is inclined to defend the claim that labels used for designation of works are rigid designators. Such a view offers a ground for discussion about the historicity of art. What has been meant when people claim that art is an historical concept? I argue that any historical theory implies a two-dimensional notion of “art”. At the end of the paper I suggest that Davies should embrace the theory of contingent identity and not the colocationist view about the relationship that exists between a particular artwork and its physical bearer.     

Married Causes

Many philosophers accept some version of a principle that says for all x, if x exists, then x plays a unique causal role. After briefly clarifying one version of the principle in Section 1, Section 2 gives reasons to doubt it by showing that there are non-identical “causal indiscernibles”—I call them “married causes.” Section 3 then sketches a few philosophical puzzles for which married causes may be helpful.