| 不完全契约下政府实施公共品负担对私人部门行为选择影响机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 冯晓威,曹吉鸣,许志远,邢梦珏.不完全契约下政府实施公共品负担对私人部门行为选择影响机制研究[J].运筹与管理,2023,32(1):218-226. |
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| 作者姓名： | 冯晓威 曹吉鸣 许志远 邢梦珏 |
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| 作者单位： | 同济大学 经济与管理学院,上海 200092 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71602107) |
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| 摘 要： | 政府部门往往会承担公共品负担提高社会公共福利和满足社会诉求，私人部门在PPP项目建设运营中会采取机会主义行为损害政府部门利益和降低社会福利。本文运用演化博弈分析私人部门的机会主义行为演化机制。通过模型分析可得，当政府补贴系数低于一定程度时，私人部门采取机会主义行为的概率随着公共品负担强度的增加而增加；当政府实施公共品负担小于一定强度时，私人部门会随着政府补贴程度提高而不采取机会主义行为，而当公共品负担强度大于一定值时，政府补贴政策正相关性就被严重削弱；私人部门占据更多的利益分配比重，更有倾向采取机会主义行为。根据研究结果，政府部门应增强契约精神，公共品负担下，政府补贴并不能有效降低机会主义行为，而应完善监管机制和提升私人部门对项目收益的信心。
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| 关 键 词： | PPP 不完全契约 公共品负担 演化博弈 机会主义行为 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-09-19 |
Research on the Mechanism of the Impact of Government’s Public Goods Burden on Private Sector with the Perspective of Incomplete Contract |
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| FENG Xiaowei,CAO Jiming,XU Zhiyuan,XING Mengjue.Research on the Mechanism of the Impact of Government’s Public Goods Burden on Private Sector with the Perspective of Incomplete Contract[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2023,32(1):218-226. |
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| Authors: | FENG Xiaowei CAO Jiming XU Zhiyuan XING Mengjue |
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| Affiliation: | School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China |
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| Abstract: | Considering the situation that government imposes the public goods burden to improve social public welfare and satisfies public demands, investors often take opportunistic behavior to protect their own interests from loss, thus damaging the interests of government and reducing social public welfare. We use evolutionary game theory to analyze the mechanism of investors’ behavior strategies and find that the probability of investors’ opportunistic behavior increases with the intensity of public goods burden, as the government subsidy is lower than a certain level. And the probability decreases with the degree of government subsidies when the public goods burden is below some level, while the effect of subsidy policy fails with intensity of public goods burden beyond a certain level. If occupying more proportion of PPP interests, investors are more inclined to take opportunistic actions. According to the research results, government should strengthen the spirit of contract, improve the regulatory mechanism and enhance the confidence of the private sector in project income not just subsidies. |
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| Keywords: | PPP incomplete contract public goods burden evolutionary game opportunistic behavior |
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