| 高管薪酬监督博弈与独立董事有效性研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 高塬,马连福.高管薪酬监督博弈与独立董事有效性研究[J].运筹与管理,2022,31(9):176-182. |
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| 作者姓名： | 高塬 马连福 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.南开大学 中国公司治理研究院,天津 300071; 2.南开大学 商学院,天津 300071; 3.天津财经大学 会计学院,天津 300222 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772094);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(18JJD630002) |
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| 摘 要： | 研究聚焦董事会内部沟通网络,基于独立董事信息共享机制探讨对高管薪酬的监督效果。研究发现,独立董事相互之间通过共享信息来增强对高管自利行为的抑制能力,有效降低了高管薪酬。同时,管理者权力对独立董事信息共享机制的监督效力起到调节作用,具体表现为随着管理者权力的增强,独立董事信息共享对于高管薪酬的约束作用被弱化,这一结果说明独立董事信息共享机制的监督有效性受到管理者权力的限制。研究构建了独立董事信息共享指标,并基于董事会监督博弈过程分析信息共享对高管自利行为的约束过程,最后运用A股上市公司数据加以验证。研究拓展了对独立董事监督机制的认识,为打开董事会“黑箱”、提升董事会绩效提供新视角,促进公司治理机制由静态结构研究向动态过程研究转化。
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| 关 键 词： | 董事会沟通 信息共享 独立董事监督 高管薪酬 管理层权力 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-02-21 |
Research Of Executive Compensation Supervision Game and Independent Director Effectiveness |
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| GAO Yuan,MA Lian-fu.Research Of Executive Compensation Supervision Game and Independent Director Effectiveness[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2022,31(9):176-182. |
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| Authors: | GAO Yuan MA Lian-fu |
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| Affiliation: | 1. China Academy of Corporate Governance, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China; 2. Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China; 3. School of accounting, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics Tianjin 300222, China |
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| Abstract: | This study focuses on the internal communication network of the board, and discusses the monitoring effectiveness of executive compensation, based on the information sharing mechanism from independent directors. It is found that independent directors share information with each other to enhance their ability to restrain the self-interested behaviors of executives and effectively reduce their compensation. At the same time, management power has a moderate effect on the monitoring process of independent directors with shared information. More specifically, as management power increases, the the restriction in executive pay by information sharing of independence director is weakened, which shows that the supervision effectiveness of information sharing mechanism is limited by management power. This study establishes a model of information sharing process, and the constraint of information sharing on managers' self-interest behavior is analyzed based on the game process of board supervision, and finally the data of a-share listed companies are used to verify the hypothesis. The study expands the understanding of the supervision mechanism of independent directors, and provides a new perspective for opening the “black box” of the board and improving the board performance, which promotes the corporate governance from static structure study to dynamic process study. |
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| Keywords: | board communication information sharing independent director monitoring executive compensation management power |
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