| 乡村振兴战略下农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 邹国良,刘娜娜,梁雁茹.乡村振兴战略下农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2022,31(4):61-68. |
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| 作者姓名： | 邹国良 刘娜娜 梁雁茹 |
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| 作者单位： | 江西理工大学 经济管理学院,江西 赣州 341000 |
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| 摘 要： | 农村人居环境整治是乡村振兴战略的重要内容,基于有限理性的演化博弈理论,构建了以地方政府、社会资本和农村居民为博弈主体的农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈模型,运用Matlab软件分析了三方主体的初始意愿和政府规制对三方主体行为策略演化的影响。研究发现:(1)政府规制对农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作博弈系统演化的影响从大到小依次是:政府对社会资本的补贴资助、投机罚金、合作奖励和政府对农村居民的参与奖励。(2)与提高地方政府对社会资本的补贴资助力度和惩罚力度相比,提高地方政府的激励规制初始意愿更能促进农村人居环境整治PPP项目的顺利落地实施。(3)农村居民参与PPP项目的初始意愿的提升关键在于提高农村居民参与收益。最后,为促进PPP模式在农村环境治理领域的应用与发展和推动农村人居环境整治的可持续改善提出相应建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 乡村振兴战略 人居环境整治 PPP 合作行为 演化博弈理论 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-09-11 |
Game Analysis of Cooperative Behavior Evolution of the PPP Model of Rural Human Settlement Improvement under the Rural Revitalization Strategy |
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| ZOU Guo-liang,LIU Na-na,LIANG Yan-ru.Game Analysis of Cooperative Behavior Evolution of the PPP Model of Rural Human Settlement Improvement under the Rural Revitalization Strategy[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2022,31(4):61-68. |
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| Authors: | ZOU Guo-liang LIU Na-na LIANG Yan-ru |
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| Affiliation: | School of Economics and Management, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Ganzhou 341000, China |
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| Abstract: | The improvement of rural human settlement environment is an important part of rural revitalization strategy. Based on the finite rational evolutionary game theory, a cooperative behavior evolutionary game model of rural habitat remediation PPP model with local government, social capital and rural residents as the main game players is constructed, and the influence of the initial willingness of the three players and government regulation on the evolution of their behavioral strategies is analyzed by Matlab software. It is found that: (1)the influence of government regulation on the evolution of the cooperative game system of the rural habitat remediation PPP model is as follows: government subsidies to social capital, speculation penalty, cooperation bonus, and government incentives to rural residents for participation, are in descending order of magnitude. (2)Compared with increasing the subsidies and penalties for social capital, increasing the initial willingness of local governments to incentivize regulation is more likely to facilitate the smooth implementation of rural habitat improvement PPP projects. (3)The key to increasing the initial willingness of rural residents to participate in PPP projects is to increase the benefits of rural residents’ participation. Finally, corresponding recommendations are made to promote the application and development of PPP in rural environmental management and to promote sustainable improvement of rural habitat improvement. |
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| Keywords: | rural revitalization strategy human settlement environment improvement PPP cooperative behavior evolutionary game theory |
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