| 质量约束下闭环供应链差异决策研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 孟丽君,黄祖庆,张宝友,杨玉香,程红亚,扈裕晴.质量约束下闭环供应链差异决策研究[J].运筹与管理,2022,31(9):99-106. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 孟丽君 黄祖庆 张宝友 杨玉香 程红亚 扈裕晴 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1.中国计量大学 经济与管理学院,浙江 杭州 310018; 2 广州大学 管理学院,广东 广州 510006 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金青年项目(71801199);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71871206,71972172);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(18YJC630123) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 针对由一原始设备制造商和一独立再制商所组成的闭环供应链系统,考虑到新品质量水平对独立再制商可回收量的质量约束效应,以及新品与再制品的价格及质量竞争,分别构建了原始设备制造商领导、独立再制商领导、无领导三种不同市场结构下闭环供应链决策模型,探讨了质量约束效应对闭环供应链运营的影响。研究表明:(1)三种市场结构下,新品和再制品两者在“质量水平-价格”两维度均有所差异,且市场地位的不对等有利于产品质量水平的共同提升;(2)质量约束效应的存在会对产品的价格和质量同时产生影响;(3)再制品具有质量劣势,且质量约束效应的增强,再制品质量劣势越大;(4)市场结构的变化及质量约束效应的强弱并不会影响市场总需求量,仅仅会影响成员企业的市场份额;在大多数情况下,消费者对新品需求更为活跃。但当原始设备制造商为市场领导者时,质量约束效应低于一阈值水平时,再制品销量反而高于新品销量;(5)无论从成员个体,还是从供应链整体,原始设备制造商为领导者的市场结构最有效,且新品质量约束效应并不会影响供应链总利润,仅影响成员企业在总利润中的分成;新品质量约束效应的增强更有利于原始设备制造商利润的改善,但同时会损害独立再制商利润。
|
| 关 键 词： | 闭环供应链 再制造 质量水平 价格 博弈模型 质量约束 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-09-04 |
Decision Research on Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on the Effect of Quality Constraint |
| |
| MENG Li-jun,HUANG Zu-qing,ZHANG Bao-you,YANG Yu-xiang,CHEN Hong-ya,HU Yu-qing.Decision Research on Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on the Effect of Quality Constraint[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2022,31(9):99-106. |
| |
| Authors: | MENG Li-jun HUANG Zu-qing ZHANG Bao-you YANG Yu-xiang CHEN Hong-ya HU Yu-qing |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics and Management, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou 310018, China; 2. School of Management, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)with an Original Equipment Manufacturer(OEM)and an independent remanufacturer (IR). OEM is a traditional manufacturing producing new product, while IR operates a reverse channel producing remanufactured product from used product recycling from customer directly. In fact, the quality of new product brought by OEM can effectively restricts the collection quantity of used product. Based on the “quality-price” dual-competition between the new products and remanufactured ones, and the quality constrainment effect, considering the three different market dominant structures(OEM-leader, IR-leader, No-leader), game models are proposed to derive the optimal quality and pricing decisions for chain members respectively, and the effect of the quality constraint on the operation of CLSC is analyzed. The results show that: (1)under the three different market structures, remanufactured products should be differentiated from new ones from the perspective of price and quality, and the chain with a leader is conductive to the improvement of product quality, whether products are new ones or remanufactured ones; (2)the existence of the quality constraint effect has an impact on the price and quality strategies simultaneously; (3)the quality of remanufactured product is inferior to that of new ones. At the same time, the enhancement of quality constraint effect leads to the quality weakness of remanufactured products greater, leaving new products to the trend of higher quality and higher price, remanufactured ones to the trend of lower quality and higher price that is harmful to the market promotion of remanufactured ones; (4)the change of market structure and the quality constraint effect have no impact on the total demand, but only the market share of chain members. Customer demand of new product is usually higher than that of remanufactured one. However, when OEM is the market leader and the quality constraint effect is lower than a threshold level, the demand of remanufactured products is higher than that of new ones; (5)the supply chain dominated by OEM is most effective from the perspective of chain member's profit and the whole supply chain's profit. The quality constraint effect has no impact on the whole supply chain's profit, but only affect the profit share between the chain members. |
| |
| Keywords: | closed-loop supply chain remanufacturing quality level price game model quality constraint |
|
| 点击此处可从《运筹与管理》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《运筹与管理》下载全文 |
|
