| 基于重复博弈的地方政府精准扶贫合作机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 张娜,李波.基于重复博弈的地方政府精准扶贫合作机制研究[J].运筹与管理,2022,31(11):77-83. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张娜 李波 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.南京信息工程大学 商学院,江苏 南京 210044; 2.石河子大学 经济与管理学院,新疆 石河子 832000; 3.北京大学贫困地区发展研究院,北京 100871 |
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| 基金项目： | 江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2022JZD080);江苏省社会科学基金项目(22EYB001) |
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| 摘 要： | 精准扶贫是习近平总书记为彻底解决贫困问题而提出一项战略要求。精准扶贫是一项复杂性较高、涉及范畴较广的系统工作,其工作的展开需要由地方政府共同协作完成。地方政府合作周期长短对精准扶贫有着巨大的影响,基于博弈论的基本思想方法,针对地方政府精准扶贫合作机制进行研究。首先,针对精准扶贫过程中完全信息静态博弈的情况,构建地方政府合作与非合作的无限次重复博弈模型,并分析双方政府均采取冷酷战略时,彼此合作的临界贴现因子;然后,针对精准扶贫过程中地方政府合作周期长短对精准扶贫成效的问题,探讨了有限重复博弈模型的临界贴现因子与地方政府合作周期的关系。分析表明:在精准扶贫过程中,双方政府合作周期越长,临界贴现因子越小,精准扶贫合作的稳定性越强。最后,针对精准扶贫过程中地方政府合作周期和合作机制等提出对策和建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 地方政府 合作机制 精准扶贫 重复博弈 贴现因子 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-07-24 |
Research on the Mechanism of Precision Poverty Reduction and Cooperation of Local Authorities Based on Repeated Game Theory |
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| ZHANG Na,LI Bo.Research on the Mechanism of Precision Poverty Reduction and Cooperation of Local Authorities Based on Repeated Game Theory[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2022,31(11):77-83. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Na LI Bo |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Business School, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, China; 3. Research Institute of Poverty Area Development, Beijing University, Beijing 100871, China |
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| Abstract: | The work of accurate poverty alleviation is a systematic project with high complexity and wide field. The implementation of its policy must be completed by the local government. The cycle of local government cooperation has a great impact on the accurate poverty alleviation. Based on the basic theory of game theory, this paper studies the mechanism of local government cooperation in poverty alleviation. First of all, according to the accurate poverty in the process of complete information static game, it establishes the game model of the construction between the government’s cooperation and non-cooperation and explores the critical discount factor when two local governments have adopted grim strategy to cooperate with each other. Secondly, in the process of cooperation, the problems between the governments for the accurate poverty cycle length on the effectiveness of poverty alleviation are discussed. The relationship between finite repeated game model of critical discount factor and government cooperation cycle is considered. The results show that in the process of accurate poverty alleviation, the longer cycle of cooperation between local governments, the smaller critical discount factor, the stronger stability between the government and the poor. Finally, this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for the local government cooperation cycle and cooperation mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | local government cooperation mechanism accurate poverty alleviation repeated game discount factor |
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