| 基于前景理论的药品质量安全监管演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵哲耘,刘玉敏,刘莉.基于前景理论的药品质量安全监管演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2022,31(10):75-81. |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵哲耘 刘玉敏 刘莉 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.郑州大学 发展规划处,河南 郑州 450001; 2.郑州大学 马克思主义学院,河南 郑州 450001; 3.郑州大学 商学院,河南 郑州 450001; 4.河南工业大学 管理学院, 450001 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(U1904211);河南省科技攻关资助项目(212102210053) |
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| 摘 要： | 现有药品质量安全监管的相关研究多从理性假设出发探讨政府与企业的互动机理,鲜有考虑企业质量安全意识的有限理性,导致模型对现实的解释能力不足。运用前景理论,通过价值函数和权重函数构建演化博弈的收益前景矩阵,研究了政府和药品生产企业的博弈过程,得到了影响企业质量安全意识的约束条件及因素。同时,研究了上市许可持有人质量激励、惩罚机制对药品生产企业质量安全意识的影响。研究结果表明:过度自信、风险偏好等是影响企业质量安全意识的重要因素;上市许可持有人的质量激励与惩罚能否发挥作用取决于企业的风险态度;在质量激励、惩罚条件下,上市许可持有人需加大监督或惩罚力度来改善企业的质量安全意识。
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| 关 键 词： | 药品质量安全 质量安全意识 前景理论 演化博弈 上市许可持有人 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-10-15 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision of Drug Quality Safety Based on Prospect Theory |
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| ZHAO Zhe-yun,LIU Yu-min,LIU Li.Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision of Drug Quality Safety Based on Prospect Theory[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2022,31(10):75-81. |
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| Authors: | ZHAO Zhe-yun LIU Yu-min LIU Li |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Development and Planning Off, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China; 2. School of Marxism, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China; 3. Business School, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China; 4. School of Management Henan University of Technology, Zhengzhou 450001, China |
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| Abstract: | Existing researches about drug quality safety supervision mostly focus on the interaction mechanism between government and drug manufacturing enterprise based on the rationality hypothesis. Bounded rationality of quality safety consciousness is rarely considered, which results in limited explanatory power to reality condition. According to Prospect Theory, value function and weight function are applied to construct the prospect pay-off matrix. The game process between government and enterprise is analyzed, and thus the constraints and factors of influencing quality safety consciousness of enterprise are obtained. Besides, this research also models and studies the influence mechanism of quality incentive and punishment from Marketing Authorization Holder(MAH) on quality safety consciousness of drug manufacturers. The results show that the quality safety consciousness of enterprises is weakened by overconfidence and risk preference; whether the quality incentive and punishment of MAH works or not depends on the risk attitude of the enterprise; under the condition of quality incentive and punishment, MAH could strengthen the supervision or punishment to improve the quality safety awareness of the enterprise. |
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| Keywords: | drug quality safety quality safety consciousness prospect theory evolutionary game marketing authorization holder |
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