| 后发企业突破低端锁定的三方演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 周华蓉,贺胜兵,刘友金.后发企业突破低端锁定的三方演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2021,30(12):58-64. |
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| 作者姓名： | 周华蓉 贺胜兵 刘友金 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.湖南科技大学 商学院, 湖南 湘潭 411201;2.湖南省战略性新兴产业研究基地,湖南 湘潭 411201 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71973041);国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(17ZDA046);教育部人文社科基金一般项目(19YJA790026) |
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| 摘 要： | 后发企业突破低端锁定是中国产业迈向全球价值链(GVC)中高端的必经之路。论文构建了一个包含后发企业、领先企业和后发企业所在国政府的三方演化博弈模型,分析后发企业策略选择的影响因素,并对博弈模型进行数值模拟分析。结果表明:复制动态系统存在{突破,封锁,消极}和{不突破,封锁,积极}两个可能的演化稳定策略组合(ESS),系统趋向哪个ESS主要由企业核心能力决定。后发企业的核心能力越强,突破收益越大,越倾向于选择“突破”策略。无论后发企业采用哪种策略,领先企业都会选择“封锁”策略。政府策略选择有机会主义倾向,但政策扶持有利于阻止本国后发企业滑向“不突破”稳定均衡,是促进企业挣脱价值链低端锁定的重要外部力量。
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| 关 键 词： | 低端锁定 核心能力 政策扶持 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-03-25 |
A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Latecomers Firms Breaking Through Low-end Locking |
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| ZHOU Hua-rong,HE Sheng-bing,LIU You-jin.A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Latecomers Firms Breaking Through Low-end Locking[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2021,30(12):58-64. |
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| Authors: | ZHOU Hua-rong HE Sheng-bing LIU You-jin |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Business school, Hunan University of Science and Technology, Xiangtan 411201, China;2. Research Base of Strategic Emerging Industries in Hunan Province, Xiangtan 411201, China |
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| Abstract: | Latecomer enterprises breaking through low-end locking is the only way which must be passed for China's industry to move towards the middle and high end of global value chain (GVC). This paper establishes a three-party evolutionary game model including latecomer enterprises, leading enterprises and governments of latecomers, analyzes the influencing factors of latecomers' strategy selection, and conducts numerical simulation analysis of the game model. The results show that the replication dynamic systems have two possible combination of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS): {breakthrough, blockade, negative} and {no breakthrough, blockade, positive}. Which ESS the system tends to is mainly determined by enterprises' core technical capabilities. The stronger the core competence, the greater the breakthrough return, the more inclined the “breakthrough” strategy is chosen. No matter which strategy the latecomers adopt, the leading enterprises will unconditionally choose the “blockade” strategy. Government policies are conducive to preventing domestic latecomer enterprises from sliding into the stable equilibrium of “no breakthrough”, which is an important external force in breaking the low-end locking of global value chain. |
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| Keywords: | low-end locking core competence government support evolutionary game |
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