| 安全评价服务质量监管三方博弈关系研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘素霞,程瑶,梅强.安全评价服务质量监管三方博弈关系研究[J].运筹与管理,2019,28(12):87-94. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘素霞 程瑶 梅强 |
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| 作者单位： | 江苏大学 管理学院,江苏 镇江 212013 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71403108,71874072);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(19YJAZH059);中国博士后科学基金(2016M590426);江苏省博士后基金(1501073C);江苏省“青蓝工程”资助项目;江苏省社会科学基金(16JD013) |
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| 摘 要： | 安全评价服务质量监管是有效防止安全生产条件差的企业从事生产经营活动,提高安全生产管制效力的重要手段。为了探究制约安评机构败德行为的有效途径,以安全评价服务市场中各参与主体为研究对象,针对安评服务质量低下、安评质量监管不力的问题,构建不完全信息下地方安监部门、安评机构、高危行业企业三方静态博弈模型,对模型均衡解进行分析,从利益实现机制出发,探索提高监管效力进而有效保障安全评价服务质量的关键条件。研究结果表明,地方安监部门、安评机构、企业行动策略的选择主要取决于各自合规行动的直接成本、违规惩罚力度以及违规被发现的概率等参数。研究结论与政策建议对提高我国安全评价服务质量具有现实指导意义。
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| 关 键 词： | 安全评价 三方博弈 服务质量 质量监管 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-04-09 |
Research on the Tripartite Game in Quality Supervision of Safety Assessment Service |
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| LIU Su-xia,CHENG Yao,MEI Qiang.Research on the Tripartite Game in Quality Supervision of Safety Assessment Service[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2019,28(12):87-94. |
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| Authors: | LIU Su-xia CHENG Yao MEI Qiang |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China |
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| Abstract: | Quality supervision of safety assessment service is an important way to effectively prevent enterprises with poor safety condition from engaging in production and operation activities and thereby to raise the effectiveness of safety regulation. In order to find out the effective way to restrict the immoral behaviors of safety assessment organizations, taking all agents in the safety assessment service market as the research object and considering low service quality of safety assessment and low effectiveness of quality supervision, the tripartite static game model among local safety supervision authorities, safety assessment organizations and enterprises of high-risk industries under incomplete information is built. The equilibrium solution of the model was analyzed. From the interest realization mechanism, the key ways to formulate regulatory countermeasures to effectively guarantee the quality of safety assessment services is explored. The results show that the actions of local safety supervision authorities, safety assessment organizations and enterprises depends mainly on the direct compliance costs, penalties for violations as well as exposure probability of violations. The conclusions and policy recommendations of this study are of guiding significance for enhancing service quality of safety assessment in our country. |
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| Keywords: | safety assessment the tripartite game service quality quality supervision |
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