| 不同渠道权力结构下的双渠道闭环供应链定价与协调决策 |
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| 引用本文： | 闻卉,郑本荣,曹晓刚,黎继子.不同渠道权力结构下的双渠道闭环供应链定价与协调决策[J].运筹与管理,2020,29(6):65-74. |
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| 作者姓名： | 闻卉 郑本荣 曹晓刚 黎继子 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.华中农业大学 经济管理学院,湖北 武汉 430070;2.湖北工业大学 理学院,湖北 武汉 430068;3.武汉纺织大学 管理学院,湖北 武汉 430073;4.南昌大学 管理学院,江西 南昌 330031 |
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| 基金项目： | 湖北省高等学校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(省社科基金前期资助项目)(19ZD036);湖北省教育厅哲学社会自然研究重点项目(19D035);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472143);湖北省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地—企业决策支持研究中心资助项目(DSS20180603) |
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| 摘 要： | 在双渠道环境下,针对不同渠道权力结构对闭环供应链最优决策的影响情况,构建了三种分散化(制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈以及由制造商和零售商构成的Nash均衡博弈)和一种集中化的闭环供应链决策模型,并得出了相关的均衡策略。在此基础上进一步有针对性的设计了两种契约相结合的契约机制协调供应链,并利用数值算例分析验证所得结论以及契约机制的有效性与可实践性,同时分析模型中的一些重要参数如渠道替代系数、传统渠道所占市场份额、废旧产品回收率、再制造成本节约等对双渠道供应链各项最优决策及渠道利润的影响。
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| 关 键 词： | 闭环供应链 双渠道 渠道权力 博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2016-12-01 |
Pricing and Coordination of Dual Channel Closed-loop Supply Chain with Different Channel Power Structure |
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| WEN Hui,ZHENG Ben-rong,CAO Xiao-gang,LI Ji-zi.Pricing and Coordination of Dual Channel Closed-loop Supply Chain with Different Channel Power Structure[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2020,29(6):65-74. |
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| Authors: | WEN Hui ZHENG Ben-rong CAO Xiao-gang LI Ji-zi |
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| Affiliation: | 1. College of Economics and Management, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan 430070, China;2. School of Science, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China;3. School of Management, Wuhan Textile University, Wuhan 430073, China;4. School of Management, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China |
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| Abstract: | Under the environment of double channel, based on different channel power structure in closed-loop supply chain, we develop three decentralized (manufacturer-led Stackelberg game, retailer-led Stackelberg game, and manufacturer and retailer Nash game)and a centralized closed-loop supply chain models. Furthermore, we obtain equilibrium solutions for each model, and design a contract mechanism combining two kinds of contracts to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, the dual channel closed-loop supply chain coordination problem in manufacturer-Stackelberg game model is explored with the benchmark of the optimal decision results of the centralized decision model. Finally, the designed coordination mechanism's effectiveness is verified and the influence of some key parameters in the model (channel substitution coefficient, the degree of the customer's preference for the retail channel, retailer recovery effort and remanufacturing cost-savings) on the equilibrium decisions and channel member profit is analyzed through numerical examples. |
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| Keywords: | closed-loop supply chain dual-channels channel power game theory |
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