| 电商生态系统中核心种群间信用机制的动态演化博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 张丽,王向向,李佳鑫.电商生态系统中核心种群间信用机制的动态演化博弈[J].运筹与管理,2020,29(4):93-101. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张丽 王向向 李佳鑫 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.天津市食品安全战略与管理研究中心,天津 300222;2.天津科技大学 经济与管理学院,天津 300222 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(14YJC630193):供应链视角下的食品安全协同运作机制研究。 |
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| 摘 要： | 网购方便快捷,然而电商平台的假货现象、诚信危机、规范缺失等问题则严重困扰整个电商生态系统,譬如拼多多赴美上市后饱受争议,电商平台中的“雷碧、康帅傅、粤利粤、脉劫”等产品长期存在。信用对电子商务至关重要,电商平台的信用监管责任已不容忽视。因此,本文基于博弈论将消费者投诉引入电商平台信用监管机制,构建了信息不对称下以电商平台、商家和消费者为主体的三方演化博弈模型;分析了在电商平台积极监管和消费者投诉双重监管条件下,各主体博弈策略选择与行为演化的影响因素及趋于稳定状态的条件,并进行演化仿真分析和数值模拟。研究表明:商家选择“诚信”策略的种群规模与电商平台的监管概率和消费者选择“投诉”策略的种群规模息息相关;建立商家诚信奖励和失信惩罚机制、信用保证金机制、消费者投诉反馈机制、严厉打击商家私下补贴,降低消费者及公众的参与成本,能够有效推动商家诚信经营。
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| 关 键 词： | 电子商务 生态系统 信用机制 动态演化 三方博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-11-02 |
Dyna mic Evolutionary Ga me of Credit Mechanis m a mong Core Popu lations in E-co mmerce Ecosyste m |
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| ZHANG Li,WANG Xiang-xiangi,LI Jia-xin.Dyna mic Evolutionary Ga me of Credit Mechanis m a mong Core Popu lations in E-co mmerce Ecosyste m[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2020,29(4):93-101. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Li WANG Xiang-xiangi LI Jia-xin |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Tianjin Food Safety Management and Strategy Research Center, Tianjin 300222, China;2. School of Economics & Management, Tianjin University of Science & Technology, Tianjin 300222, China |
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| Abstract: | Shopping online is very convenient,but there are still many problems such as counterfeit goods,credibility crisis,and lack of norms in the e-commerce ecosystem.For example,The listing of the Pingduoduo has been controversial.Products as such“Leibi,Kang Shuaifu,Yueli Yue,and Maibo”Still exist in the e-commerce.Credit is very important for e-commerce,and the credit supervision responsibility of e-commerce platform can not be ignored.Therefore,based on the game theory,consumer complaints are introduced into the credit supervision mechanism of the e-commerce platform,and a long-term strategic evolution game model is constructed under the asymmetric information.The influencing factors of game strategy selection and behavior e-volution under the dual supervision of active supervision of e-commerce platform and consumer complaint as well as the conditions of the stable state are analyzed,and evolution simulation analysis and numerical simulation are carried out.The research shows that the scale of merchants choosing the“integrity”strategy is closely related to the regulatory probability of the e-commerce platform and the population size of the consumer’s“complaint”strategy.The establishment of merchant credit reward and punishment mechanism,credit guarantee mechanism,consumer complaint feedback mechanism,and strict crackdown on private subsidies of merchants,reducing the cost of participation of consumers and the public,which can lead to business integrity management. |
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| Keywords: | e-commerce ecosystem credit mechanism dynamic evolutionary three-party game |
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