首页 | 官方网站   微博 | 高级检索  
     

政府补贴下闭环供应链回收渠道的选择策略
引用本文:林贵华,单仁邦,陈拼博.政府补贴下闭环供应链回收渠道的选择策略[J].运筹与管理,2020,29(4):43-53.
作者姓名:林贵华  单仁邦  陈拼博
作者单位:上海大学 管理学院,上海 200444
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(11671250);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(15YJA630034)。
摘    要:本文考虑由单一制造商、单一零售商以及单一第三方构成的闭环供应链系统,主要研究其回收渠道的选择问题,并综合分析政府补贴政策对不同主体回收策略选择的影响。本文建立了不同主体回收的决策模型,对集中决策和分散决策下的最优策略进行了理论分析,并通过数值实验验证了如下理论结果:在政府补贴的不同区间内,决策者(政府、消费者和政策制定者等)所选择的回收渠道可能会截然不同;政府补贴越少,决策者越倾向于选择零售商回收;政府补贴越多,决策者则越倾向于选择第三方回收。

关 键 词:闭环供应链  政府补贴  回收渠道  Stackelberg博弈  
收稿时间:2018-08-05

Selection Strategies of Recycling Channels in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Govern ment Subsidy
LIN Gui-hua,SHAN Ren-bang,CHEN Pin-bo.Selection Strategies of Recycling Channels in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Govern ment Subsidy[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2020,29(4):43-53.
Authors:LIN Gui-hua  SHAN Ren-bang  CHEN Pin-bo
Affiliation:School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China
Abstract:In this paper,we consider a closed-loop supply chain system composed of a single manufacturer,a single retailer,and a single third party.We mainly discuss the selection strategies of recycling channels and analyze the impact of government subsidies on choices of recycling strategies for different decision makers.We establish some decision models for different recycling agents and give a theoretical analysis of optimal decisions for centralized decision making and decentralized decision making strategies.The numerical experiments demon-strate the following theoretical results:In different ranges of government subsidies,the decision makers(such as government,consumer,policy makers and so on)may choose different recycling channels.That is,if the govern-ment expends less subsidies,the decision makers are inclined to choose retailer recycling and conversely,they prefer to choose the third party recycling with more subsidies.
Keywords:closed-loop supply chain  government subsidy  recyclingchannels  stackelberg game
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《运筹与管理》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《运筹与管理》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司    京ICP备09084417号-23

京公网安备 11010802026262号