| 基于银行下侧风险规避的第三方B2B平台激励策略研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 于静,庄新田.基于银行下侧风险规避的第三方B2B平台激励策略研究[J].运筹与管理,2020,29(9):186-195. |
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| 作者姓名： | 于静 庄新田 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北大学 工商管理学院, 辽宁 沈阳 110167 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671030) |
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| 摘 要： | 以电子仓单融资为例, 基于银行下侧风险规避角度, 研究联合授信和委托授信下当第三方B2B平台存在行为隐匿的道德风险时, 银行对B2B平台的激励策略设计问题。研究发现:B2B平台的最优努力水平随收益分配比例、回购比例的增大而减小, 随质押率、贷款利率、产品采购量、损失补偿比例的增大而增大;同时银行为规避违约风险, 需设置质押率、贷款利率和贷款额上限及回购比例下限, 并且银行最优收益分配比例与损失补偿比例、最优损失补偿比例与贷款损失率均成正相关关系。此外, 随着B2B平台工作效率的提高, 联合授信下最优收益分配比例将减小, 最优损失补偿比例将增大, 最终近似于委托授信下的最优损失补偿比例。最后给出数值分析。
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| 关 键 词： | 下侧风险规避 B2B平台 收益分配比例 损失补偿比例 激励策略 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017-08-27 |
Research into Incentive Strategy of Third-party B2B Platform Based on Risk Aversion of Banks |
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| YU Jing,ZHUANG Xin-tian.Research into Incentive Strategy of Third-party B2B Platform Based on Risk Aversion of Banks[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2020,29(9):186-195. |
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| Authors: | YU Jing ZHUANG Xin-tian |
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| Affiliation: | School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110167, China |
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| Abstract: | Taking electronic warehouse receipt financing as an example, which is based on bank’s downside risk aversion, this paper applies the principal-agent theory to study the incentive strategy design of banks for B2B platforms when B2B platforms have hidden moral risks under the joint credit mode and the entrusted credit mode. The study finds that the optimal effort level of B2B platform decreases with the increase of income distribution ratio and repurchase ratio, and increases with the increase of pledge rate, loan interest rate, product purchase quantity and loss compensation ratio. At the same time, in order to avoid default risks, banks need to set the upper limit of pledge rate, loan interest rate and loan amount and the lower limit of repurchase ratio. What’s more, the bank’s optimal income distribution ratio is positively correlated with the loss compensation ratio, and the optimal loss compensation ratio is also positively correlated with the loan loss rate. In addition, with the improvement of working efficiency of B2B platform, the optimal income distribution ratio will be reduced and the optimal loss compensation ratio will be increased under the joint credit mode, and finally the optimal loss compensation ratio will be similar to the optimal loss compensation ratio which is under the entrusted credit mode. At last, a numerical analysis is given. |
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| Keywords: | downside risk aversion B2B platform income distribution ratio loss compensation ratio incentive strategy |
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