| Abstract: | Repeated games describe situations where players interact with each other in a dynamic pattern and make decisions according to outcomes of previous stage games. Very recently, Press and Dyson have revealed a new class of zero-determinant(ZD) strategies for the repeated games, which can enforce a fixed linear relationship between expected payoffs of two players, indicating that a smart player can control her unwitting co-player's payoff in a unilateral way Proc. Acad. Natl. Sci.USA 109, 10409(2012)]. The theory of ZD strategies provides a novel viewpoint to depict interactions among players,and fundamentally changes the research paradigm of game theory. In this brief survey, we first introduce the mathematical framework of ZD strategies, and review the properties and constrains of two specifications of ZD strategies, called pinning strategies and extortion strategies. Then we review some representative research progresses, including robustness analysis,cooperative ZD strategy analysis, and evolutionary stability analysis. Finally, we discuss some significant extensions to ZD strategies, including the multi-player ZD strategies, and ZD strategies under noise. Challenges in related research fields are also listed. |
