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Maintenance of cooperation induced by punishment in public goods games
Authors:Wang Zhen  Xu Zhao-Jin  Huang Jian-Hua and Zhang Lian-Zhong
Affiliation:School of Physics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China; School of Science, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China
Abstract:In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.
Keywords:public goods games  punishment  degree of rationality  evolution
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