| 供应链网络道德风险演化与仿真研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 慕静,毛金月. 供应链网络道德风险演化与仿真研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2013, 22(4): 68-76 |
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| 作者姓名： | 慕静 毛金月 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津科技大学 食品安全战略与管理研究中心,经济与管理学院 天津 300222 |
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| 基金项目： | 天津市教委人文社会科学重大项目(2012ZD044)阶段成果 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对目前供应链网络存在的越来越严重的道德风险问题,利用演化博弈和系统动力学理论,从供应链网络结构入手,对其演化过程进行了研究。首先基于供应商之间合作过程中的诚信和败德行为,建立供应链网络同级企业间道德风险的演化博弈模型,并分析了其演化路径。其次通过对制造商和供应商之间博弈的动态性分析,建立供应链网络上下游企业间道德风险演化的SD模型,并对其演化过程进行了仿真分析。研究结果表明:供应链网络道德风险的演化结果取决于网络内败德企业获得的超额收益、收益调整程度、惩罚力度和惩罚机制。另外,罚款力度大小与供应链网络道德风险演化的动态性密切相关;动态惩罚机制在其演化的波动性控制方面,具有明显效果。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链网络 道德风险 演化博弈 系统动力学(SD) |
| 收稿时间： | 2012-07-13 |
A Study on Evolution and Simulation of Moral Hazard in Supply Chain Networks |
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| MU Jing,MAO Jin-yue. A Study on Evolution and Simulation of Moral Hazard in Supply Chain Networks[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2013, 22(4): 68-76 |
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| Authors: | MU Jing MAO Jin-yue |
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| Affiliation: | Food Safety Strategy and Management Research Center, College of Economics & Management, Tianjin University of Science & Technology, Tianjin 300222, China |
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| Abstract: | As the increasingly serious problem of moral hazard exists in current supply chain network, the paper uses evolutionary game and system dynamics theory to study on the evolution of moral hazard in current supply chain network from both horizontal and vertical perspectives. Firstly, based on the integrity and immoral behavior of the process of cooperation between the suppliers, the paper establishes the lateral evolutionary game model of moral hazard in supply chain network and analyzes the evolutionary path. Secondly, followed by dynamic analysis on supervision game between the manufacturer and supplier, the paper establishes multi-person evolutionary game model based on SD, and simulates the evolutionary equilibrium and the process of moral hazard of the supply chain network from vertical view. The results show that: the evolution results of moral hazard in the supply chain network depend on the excess returns of immoral companies within the network, the degree of adjustment to revenue, penalties and punishment mechanism. In addition, the fine intensity is closely related to the dynamic of the evolution process of moral hazard in the supply chain network; the dynamic penalty strategy has a significant effect on volatility control of the evolution process. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain network moral hazard evolutionary game system dynamics(SD) |
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