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| 基于多层委托—代理关系的环境规制研究 | |
| 引用本文： | 薛红燕,王怡,孙菲,孙裔德. 基于多层委托—代理关系的环境规制研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2013, 22(6): 249-255 |
| 作者姓名： | 薛红燕 王怡 孙菲 孙裔德 |
| 作者单位： | 东北石油大学 经济管理学院,黑龙江 大庆 163318 |
| 基金项目： | 黑龙江省教育厅人文社会科学项目:环境规制、技术创新与黑龙江省区域经济可持续发展动力系统和路经研究(12522006) |
| 摘 要： | 环境规制中企业、政府和环境规制机构三者之间的博弈关系是影响环境污染治理的重要因素。本文运用博弈论原理,分析了信息不对称下规制机构与企业合谋的可能与政府监管的必要,将环境规制划分为规制合约的设计与选择、执行与监管两个阶段,构建了多阶段的委托代理模型,考察了政府合约设计和监管、环境规制机构与企业合谋的因素,得到了环境规制中影响行为主体的关键政策变量,并提出了相应的政策建议。 |
| 关 键 词： | 环境规制 多层委托—代理 合谋 规制俘虏 |
| 收稿时间： | 2012-04-05 |
Research on Environmental Regulation Models Based on Multiple Principal-Agent |
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| XUE Hong-yan,WANG Yi,SUN Fei,SUN Yi-de. Research on Environmental Regulation Models Based on Multiple Principal-Agent[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2013, 22(6): 249-255 | |
| Authors: | XUE Hong-yan WANG Yi SUN Fei SUN Yi-de |
| Affiliation: | School of Economics and Management, Daqing Petroleum Institute, Daqing 163318, China |
| Abstract: | The game relations are the important factors which affect pollution abatement among the enterprise, government and environmental regulatioin agency in pollution abatement. By game theory,this paper analyzes the possibility of collusion between the enterprise and environmental regulatioin agency ,and the necessity of government supervision under the circumstance of asymmetric information.The paper also establishes multiple principal-agent model which includes the stage of contract design and supervision and the stage of collusion.Based on it, we get the key variables which affect the stakeholders' behaviros.Finally, the paper provides corresponding policies. |
| Keywords: | environmental regulation multiple principal-agent collusion regulatory capture |
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