面向制造成本甄别和销售努力激励的供应链协调契约研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对二级供应链中制造商隐藏成本信息和销售商隐藏努力行动引发的低效率问题, 结合委托代理理论, 引入一个虚拟第三方为利他的委托人, 建立逆向选择和道德风险下供应链协调模型, 来甄别制造商的真实成本且对销售商的努力实施有效激励, 并通过模型求解得到供应链实现协调时各契约参数需满足的关系. 结果表明, 所设计的协调契约能够激励制造商自愿真实上报成本信息, 刺激销售商寻求低成本的制造商进行合作并付出最优努力. 最后, 通过算例分析验证了契约模型对供应链协调的有效性.

关键词: 逆向选择, 道德风险, 供应链协调, 虚拟第三方

Abstract: To solve the low efficiency caused by hiding of the manufacturer's cost and retailer's efforts in a two-echelon supply chain, a virtual-third party was introduced as a selfless principal based on principal agent theory. Firstly, a supply chain coordination model under adverse selection and moral hazard was developed to screen the manufacturer's true cost and make retailer work hard. Secondly, the relationship among the coordination contract parameters was obtained. Finally, main results revealed that the coordination contract could incent the manufacturer to tell the truth, and the retailer cooperated with the low-cost manufacturers to carry out the optimal efforts. Furthermore, a numerical example was used to verify the conclusions.

Key words: adverse selection, moral hazard, supply chain coordination, virtual-third party

中图分类号:

F224

黄梅萍, 汪贤裕, 张欢. 面向制造成本甄别和销售努力激励的供应链协调契约研究[J]. 运筹学学报, 2014, 18(4): 45-57.

HUANG Meiping, WANG Xianyu, ZHANG Huan. Supply chain coordination contract with manufacturing cost screening and sales effort incentives[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2014, 18(4): 45-57.

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