关键词: 线上分类回收, 收益管理, 道德风险概率, 逆向选择

Abstract: The business pattern of reverse commerce improves the performance of used-product buyback a lot. However, the lack of customer trust brings reverse commerce providers into the dilemma of frequent price renegotiation. To solve the problem, we investigate whether cheating makes the provider better off. This paper considers the transaction in which a provider buys back two grades of used products. A customer may underestimate or overestimate the grade of his product. The provider always picks out the customer’s overestimation error, but a moral hazard may happen as to the customer’s underestimation error. To avoid the risk, customers may select the grade adversely. Using the Stackelberg game model, we explore order submission decisions of the customer and optimal moral hazard probability decisions of the provider. The results show that the reverse commerce provider is not always dishonest. It depends on both the quality profile of used products and the renegotiation cost of buyer and seller. Our findings provide helpful managerial insights for the policymaker to supervise online reverse commerce.

Key words: reverse commerce, revenue management, moral hazard probability, adverse selection