关键词: 信息分享, 奖惩机制, 闭环供应链, 社会福利, 消费者剩余

Abstract: This paper studies the retailer' strategy of information sharing and its impact on the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)under reward-penalty mechanism(RPM). We develop a CLSC model which consists of one manufacturer, one retailer and consumers, in which the manufacturer collects waste products and then conducts remanufacturing. In this model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. We use game theory to solve this dynamic decision problem. Furthermore, we investigate the centralized case and decentralized cases, which includes the cases that the retailer shares information and does not share information. The results show that, if the target of the social welfare includes the reward-penalty cost and the degree of collection difficulty is low relatively, information sharing increases the social welfare, otherwise, it decreases the total social welfare; the information sharing strategy always reduces the expected consumer surplus, while it can enhance the collection rate. Finally, we design a collection responsibility sharing contract to encourage the retailer to share information under the setting where the information sharing strategy strengthens the social welfare.

Key words: information sharing, reward-penalty mechanism, closed-loop supply chain, social welfare, consumer surplus